Scholarly Commons @ UNLV Boyd Law
Scholarly Works

Faculty Scholarship

2012

Mandatory Binding Arbitration Clauses Prevent Consumers from
Presenting Procedurally Difficult Claims
Jean R. Sternlight
University of Nevada, Las Vegas -- William S. Boyd School of Law

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholars.law.unlv.edu/facpub
Part of the Dispute Resolution and Arbitration Commons

Recommended Citation
Sternlight, Jean R., "Mandatory Binding Arbitration Clauses Prevent Consumers from Presenting
Procedurally Difficult Claims" (2012). Scholarly Works. 744.
https://scholars.law.unlv.edu/facpub/744

This Article is brought to you by the Scholarly Commons @ UNLV Boyd Law, an institutional repository administered
by the Wiener-Rogers Law Library at the William S. Boyd School of Law. For more information, please contact
youngwoo.ban@unlv.edu.

3.STERNLIGHT.MACRO.10.29.12 (DO NOT DELETE)

1/24/2013 1:52 PM

MANDATORY BINDING ARBITRATION
CLAUSES PREVENT CONSUMERS FROM
PRESENTING PROCEDURALLY DIFFICULT
CLAIMS
Jean R. Sternlight*
I.

INTRODUCTION

The longstanding debate over the benefits and detriments of mandatory
arbitration in the consumer context has often focused on the wrong issue.
Although we have now argued for almost twenty years over whether it is
appropriate to require consumers to arbitrate rather than litigate claims
against providers of products and services,1 too often commentators have
asked whether consumers win or lose when they bring claims in
arbitration,2 rather   than   whether   consumers’   claims   are   suppressed   or  
* Saltman Professor and Director of the Saltman Center for Conflict Resolution, UNLV
Boyd School of Law. I thank Ron Aronovsky, the ABA Dispute Resolution Section, Myriam
Gilles and Cardozo Law School for hosting conferences at which I first aired these ideas. I thank
Elaine Shoben for her excellent feedback. I thank my research assistants Sarah Mead, Jaimie Stilz
and David Schnell-Davis and reference librarian Jennifer Gross for their competent hard work and
perseverance.
1. For some of the earliest criticisms of the imposition of mandatory binding arbitration on
consumers and employees, see Jean R. Sternlight, Panacea or Corporate Tool?: Debunking the
Supreme Court’s Preference for Binding Arbitration, 74 Wash. U.L.Q. 637, 642 (1996)
[hereinafter Sternlight, Panacea]; David S. Schwartz, Enforcing Small Print to Protect Big
Business: Employee and Consumer Rights Claims in an Age of Compelled Arbitration, 1997 WIS.
L. REV. 33, 53-55 (1997); Paul D. Carrington & Paul H. Haagen, Contract and Jurisdiction, 1996
SUP. CT. REV. 331, 401 (1996). For partial or complete defenses of the practice see Amy Schmitz,
Legislating in the Light: Considering Empirical Data in Crafting Arbitration Reforms, 15 HARV.
NEGOT. L. REV. 115, 172 (2010) (arguing that complete abolition of mandatory consumer
arbitration would likely harm consumers); Sarah R. Cole, On Babies and Bathwater: The
Arbitration Fairness Act and the Supreme Court’s Recent Arbitration Jurisprudence, 48 HOUS. L.
REV. 457, 469-70 (2011); PETER B. RUTLEDGE, U.S. CHAMBER INST. FOR LEGAL REFORM,
ARBITRATION—A GOOD DEAL FOR CONSUMERS: A RESPONSE TO PUBLIC CITIZEN 28 (2008),
available at http://www.instituteforlegalreform.com/get_ilr_doc.php?id=1091.
2. See Samuel Estreicher, Saturns for Rickshaws: The Stakes in the Debate Over Predispute
Employment Arbitration Agreements, 16 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 559, 564–566 (2001); Peter
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eliminated  altogether  as  a  result  of  companies’  use  of  mandatory  arbitration  
clauses.3
The  Supreme  Court’s  decision  in  AT&T Mobility v. Concepcion4 brings
this claim suppression issue to the forefront, as that decision allows
companies to use arbitration clauses to insulate themselves from exposure
to  plaintiffs’  class  actions.5 A 2012 report by the advocacy group, Public
Citizen, identified   “76   potential   class   action   cases   where   judges   cited  
Concepcion and held that class action bans within arbitration clauses were
enforceable.”6 There is substantial reason to believe that many more
B. Rutledge, Whither Arbitration?, 6 GEO. J. L. & PUB. POL’Y 549, 556–60, 570 (2008)
(examining consumer and employee win rates and recoveries in arbitration, relative to litigation,
albeit later recognizing that arbitration can also be critiqued for eliminating access to class
actions). See also Martin H. Malin, The Arbitration Fairness Act: It Need Not and Should Not Be
an All or Nothing Proposition, 87 IND. L.J. 289, 292–96 (2012) (focusing on win-loss rates in
employment arbitration, while also noting that most employment claims “of modest value are not
likely to lend themselves to class action treatment”).
3. See David S. Schwartz, Claim-Suppressing Arbitration: The New Rules, 87 IND. L.J. 239,
240 (2012); NACA Legislative Unit, Consumer Attorneys Report: Arbitration Clauses are
Everywhere, Consequently Causing Consumer Claims to Disappear, NAT’L ASSOC. OF
CONSUMER ADVOCATES 1 (June 25, 2012), http://www.naca.net/sites/default/files/
NACA2012BMASurveyFinalRedacted_1.pdf [hereinafter Consumer Attorneys Report]; Alliance
for Justice et al. Comments Regarding the Notice and Request for Information on the Scope,
Methods, and Data Sources for Conducting Study of Pre-Dispute Arbitration Agreements, to
Bureau of Consumer Financial Protection (June 23, 2012), available at http://www.citizen.org/
documents/group-comments-to-cfpb-re-arbitration-study.pdf; Letter from Lisa Gilbert, Acting
Dir., Public Citizen, Congress Watch division, to Monica Jackson, Exec. Sec’y, Consumer Fin.
Prot. Bureau, Comments of Public Citizen Regarding the Notice and Request for Information on
the Scope, Methods, and Data Sources for Conducting Study of Pre-Dispute Arbitration
Agreements, at 13 (June 23, 2012) (. . .the impact of the mere existence of arbitration clauses in
consumer contracts is tremendous, because they suppress valid legal claims of most, if not all,
American consumers who are parties to financial services contracts), available at
www.citizen.org/documents/public-citizen-comments-to-cfpb-re-arbitration-study.pdf.
4. AT&T Mobility v. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740, 1753 (2011).
5. Id. at 1753. See Jean R. Sternlight, Tsunami: AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion
Impedes Access to Justice, 90 OR. L. REV. 703, 706-07 (2012) [hereinafter Tsunami]. See also
Maureen Weston, The Death of Class Action After Concepcion?, 60 KAN. L. REV. 767 (2012);
Consumer Attorneys Report, supra note 3, at 1 (“The presence of an arbitration clause in a
contract, particularly one that includes a waiver of the consumer’s right to join in a class
proceeding, means that consumer claims will be suppressed.”).
6. PUBLIC CITIZEN & NAT’L ASSOC. OF CONSUMER ADVOCATES, JUSTICE DENIED—ONE
YEAR LATER: THE HARMS TO CONSUMERS FROM THE SUPREME COURT’S CONCEPCION
DECISION ARE PLAINLY EVIDENT 4 (2012), available at http://www.citizen.org/documents/
concepcion-anniversary-justice-denied-report.pdf [hereinafter JUSTICE DENIED]. There have been
numerous additional similar decisions since publication of that study. See, e.g., Pendergast v.
Sprint Nextel Corp., 691 F.3d 1224, 1235-36 (11th Cir. 2012) (affirming district court decision
refusing to hold arbitral class action waiver unconscionable on the ground that even if the waiver
were unconscionable Concepcion would preempt and therefore invalidate such a finding); Homa
v. American Express Co., No. 00-CV-229-B, 2012 WL 3594231, at *4 (3d Cir. Aug. 22, 2012)
(finding that Concepcion requires that arbitral class action waivers be upheld, and stating that
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companies in the consumer setting, post-Concepcion, will use arbitration to
prevent consumers from joining together in class actions either in
arbitration or in litigation.7 Indeed, a recent empirical study by Professor
Myriam Gilles of thirty-seven consumer clauses found that all of them
contained class action waivers and that most of the clauses had been
amended in the aftermath of Concepcion.8 While the Article recognizes
that some simpler consumer claims can indeed be brought in arbitration, it
contends   that   many   “procedurally   difficult”   consumer   claims cannot
realistically be brought individually, by consumers, in arbitration.9 Thus,
by preventing consumers from joining together in class actions Concepcion
has greatly reduced the likelihood that consumers can enforce certain of
their legal rights in any forum.10
One   could   use   many   metaphors   to   try   to   describe   commentators’  
improper focus on the results in arbitration hearings rather than the claim
suppression impact of mandatory arbitration. I have chosen a science
fiction metaphor. Imagine that a villain has spread poison over the earth
that has killed ninety-nine percent of the plants on our planet. Imagine,
further, that one percent of the plants have survived, for some mysterious
reason being immune to the poison. Scientists are trying to analyze the
scope of the disaster. The Group A scientists are busily measuring the

“[e]ven if [plaintiff] cannot effectively prosecute his claim in an individual arbitration that
procedure is his only remedy, illusory or not.”).
7. Even before Concepcion, when companies had to worry in many jurisdictions that an
arbitral class action waiver might be struck down as unconscionable, many companies were using
arbitration clauses to block consumers’ access to arbitration. See Theodore Eisenberg, Geoffrey P.
Miller & Emily Sherwin, Arbitration’s Summer Soldiers: An Empirical Study of Arbitration
Clauses in Consumer and Nonconsumer Contracts, 41 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 871, 882–85 (2008)
(finding that 77 % of the consumer contracts studied contained arbitration clauses, that all of these
prohibited arbitral class actions, and that 80% prohibited all class actions); SEARLE CIVIL JUSTICE
INST., CONSUMER ARBITRATION BEFORE THE AMERICAN ARBITRATION ASSOCIATION 102
(2009) (reporting that every arbitration agreement studied covering credit cards or cell phone
services proscribed class actions). See also PEW HEALTH GRP., HIDDEN RISKS: THE CASE FOR
SAFE AND TRANSPARENT CHECKING ACCOUNTS 18 (2012), available at http://www.pewstates.
org/uploadedFiles/PCS_Assets/2011/SafeChecking_Pew_Report_HiddenRisks.pdf (observing that
94 percent of checking accounts at the 10 largest U.S. banks include a clause waiving the right to
bring a class action suit).
8. Myriam Gilles, Killing Them with Kindness: Examining “Consumer-Friendly”
Arbitration Clauses After AT&T Mobility vs. Concepcion, 88 NOTRE DAME L. REV. (forthcoming
2013), http://ssrn.com/abstract=2132604 (studying clauses issued by some of the best known
national companies in areas such as telecommunications, consumer banking and credit cards, ecommerce, and entertainment).
9. The terms “procedurally difficult” and “procedurally easy” are part of a taxonomy
enunciated in this article to distinguish among critically different types of consumer claims. See
infra Part III.
10. See Tsunami, supra note 5, at 704-05.
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growth of the few plants that were not killed by the poison. They observe
that these plants are actually thriving—growing just as quickly or perhaps
even more quickly than they ever  did.    But  don’t  we  all  agree  these  Group  
A   scientists   have   missed   the   main   event?      Isn’t   the   primary   issue   the   one  
being focused on by the Group B scientists, who are extremely disturbed
that 99% of the plants on earth have been destroyed? While I admit to
despising  the  Supreme  Court’s  decision  in Concepcion,11 I do at least credit
it for providing more acuity in the world of mandatory consumer
arbitration. We can now see more clearly than ever before both how
companies can use arbitration clauses to insulate themselves from class
actions and also what impact such clauses are likely to have on consumers.
Ten years ago I wrote an article—As Mandatory Binding Arbitration
Meets the Class Action Will the Class Action Survive?12 The Article offered
some suggestions as to how courts might use contractual or statutory
arguments to strike down the class action waivers that were, at the time,
increasingly becoming part of the arbitration clauses companies were
imposing on their customers.13 For a time courts used these tools to strike
down certain such waivers, finding they were unconscionable or would
prevent consumers from vindicating their rights under federal law.14
However,   the   Court’s   Concepcion decision held that at least one
court’s  use  of  unconscionability to strike down arbitral class action waivers
was preempted by the Federal Arbitration Act,15 and as I have discussed
elsewhere many courts are interpreting this decision quite broadly to block
all unconscionability attacks on arbitral class action waivers.16 Indeed,
some courts are even holding that the distinct vindication of federal rights
argument for voiding arbitral class action waivers was weakened if not
eliminated by Concepcion, though the decision did not directly discuss that
argument.17 While the vindication of federal rights argument remains hotly
contested, and conceivably may survive,18 it likely will not apply to
11. 131 S. Ct. 140.
12. Jean R. Sternlight, As Mandatory Binding Arbitration Meets the Class Action Will the
Class Action Survive?, 42 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1 (2000) [hereinafter Mandatory Binding
Arbitration]. See also Myriam Gilles, Opting Out of Liability: The Forthcoming, Near-Total
Demise of the Modern Class Action, 104 MICH. L. REV. 373, 393 n.101 (2005).
13. Mandatory Binding Arbitration, supra note 12, at 106. Specifically, the Article
suggested that courts could use either unconscionability arguments or vindication of statutory
rights arguments to strike down arbitral class action waivers.
14. See Tsunami, supra note 5, at 703, 706.
15. 131 S. Ct. at 1753.
16. See supra note 5.
17. Tsunami, supra note 5, at 714–15. See also Weston, supra note 5, at 124-25.
18. See In re Am. Express Merchants’ Litig., 667 F.3d 204, 214–20 (2d Cir. 2012) (voiding
arbitral class action prohibition, even post-Concepcion, on the ground that it would prevent
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consumer claims brought under common law or possibly state statutes.19
Thus, it is clear, at minimum, that Concepcion has made it much easier for
companies to insulate themselves from consumer class actions.20
But is the elimination of many or even virtually all consumer class
actions detrimental or instead perhaps even beneficial to consumers? This
is a modern version of a question I asked in an article now almost twenty
years ago: Mandatory Binding Arbitration: Panacea or Corporate Tool?21
Some urge that consumer arbitration offers a more effective way for
consumers to resolve their claims than do class actions.22 They contend that
whereas consumer class actions purportedly provided no significant benefit
to consumers, in that trial attorneys rather than individual plaintiffs
supposedly secured the bulk of any benefits obtained through class
actions,23 consumers can present their claims quickly and inexpensively in
individualized arbitration.24 For example, Matt Webb, a senior vice
president of the United States Chamber of Commerce stated that whereas
class actions are flawed, designed by and for lawyers, arbitration can
provide  better  benefits  to  consumers:  “If  you  have  a  $30  dispute  and  a  good  
arbitration system in place, one that is administered fairly,. . . you have the
ability  to  get  a  claim  resolved  without  giving  money  to  a  lawyer.”25
Indeed, some have even suggested that, at least on occasion, a company
might hurt itself rather than consumers by eliminating class actions, because
the company might then face numerous individual claims brought in
arbitration.26 One   might   draw   an   analogy   to   the   story   of   the   Sorcerer’s  

affected merchants from asserting claims under federal antitrust laws). See also Myriam Gilles &
Gary Friedman, After Class: Aggregate Litigation in the Wake of AT&T Mobility v. Concepcion,
79 U. CHI. L. REV. 623, 633-37 (discussing and advocating for survival of “vindication of federal
statutory rights” argument even following Court’s decision in Concepcion).
19. Gilles & Friedman, supra note 18, at 648-53 (recognizing that “vindication of federal
rights” argument does not work when class action prohibition curtails state claims, but still
suggesting ways to distinguish Concepcion).
20. Id. at 627, n.17.
21. Sternlight, Panacea, supra note 1.
22. See articles cited supra note 2.
23. See, e.g., Rutledge, supra note 2, at 572-73.
24. See Estreicher, supra note 2, at 564 (claiming that his conclusions apply to both
employees and consumers, although Estreicher’s argument focuses more on the former).
25. David Segal, A Rising Tide Against Class-Action Suits, N.Y. TIMES (May 6, 2012),
http://www.nytimes.com/2012/05/06/your-money/class-actions-face-hurdle-in-2011-supremecourt-ruling.html.
26. Malin, supra note 2, at 300 n.79. Malin discusses his own personal experience as an
employment arbitrator in which the company, having enforced an arbitral class action waiver, was
sued in arbitration by forty other individuals. Because the relevant AAA rules required the
company to deposit anticipated arbitrator fees for each case up front Malin posits that the
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Apprentice, in which the apprentice cut an enchanted broom in half to stop
it from bringing water only to be faced with more and more brooms each
carrying water.27 In the summer of 2011, after AT&T Mobility had won its
great victory in Concepcion, AT&T announced that it intended a $39 billion
takeover of cell phone carrier T-Mobile.28 A law firm that normally handles
class actions filed over a thousand individual arbitration claims against
AT&T, seeking to block the merger.29 However, in response, AT&T sued
the customers who had brought those claims in at least eight federal court
actions.30 The federal   courts   all   rejected   the   customers’   attempts   to   use  
arbitration to secure the requested injunctive relief.31 Some consumer
advocates have now founded an organization, Consumers Count, which
attempts to use social media to help consumers join together to bring
multiple individual claims in arbitration.32
Is it realistic to think that class actions might be replaced by individual
claims? Would many individuals who were blocked from filing class
actions proceed individually? Moreover, can such individual actions serve
the same purpose as class actions—not only to compensate wronged
consumers but also to deter companies from engaging in misconduct?33
employer may have had to deposit more than $500,000 up front, and that the anticipated costs of
the forty cases gave the employees substantial settlement leverage. Id.
27. The Sorcerer’s Apprentice story was first told in a poem by Goethe, Der Zauberlehrling,
and then popularized in the Disney film Fantasia. See The Sorcerer’s Apprentice, WIKIPEDIA,
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/The_Sorcerer’s_Apprentice (last visited Jun. 26, 2012). The author
credits attorney Joseph Sellers for sharing the sorcerer’s apprentice metaphor at a conference in
April 2012. However, Sellers was not suggesting that individual arbitration could take the place of
class actions, but only that multiple smaller class actions might be more threatening to a company
than a single large class action.
28. Daniel Fisher, AT&T’s Arbitration Victory Breeds Swarm of Antitrust Cases, FORBES
(Aug. 18, 2011, 4:36 PM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/danielfisher/2011/08/18/atts-arbitrationvictory-breeds-swarm-of-antitrust-cases/.
29. See Scott A. Bursor, Fight AT&T’s Takeover of T-Mobile, BURSOR & FISHER P.A.,
http://www.fightthemerger.com (last visited June 26, 2012) (detailing efforts of law firm Bursor &
Fisher P.A. to stop the proposed merger).
30. Fisher, supra note 28.
31. See AT&T Mobility LLC v. Bernardi, No. C11-03992 CRB, 2011 WL 5079549, at *13
(N.D. Cal. Oct. 26, 2011); AT&T Mobility LLC v. Gonnello, No. 11 Civ. 5636(PKC), 2011 WL
4716617, at *4-5 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 7, 2011). See also Jeffrey May, Wolters Kluwer Law &
Business, Customers’ Efforts to Use Arbitration to Challenge AT&T/T-Mobile Merger Fail,
ANTITRUSTCONNECT BLOG (Oct. 31, 2011), http://antitrustconnect.com/2011/10/31/customers
%E2%80%99-efforts-to-use-arbitration-to-challenge-attt-mobile-merger-fail/.
32. See Consumers Count, www.consumerscount.org (last visited Oct. 12, 2012). This
organization will be discussed in further detail. See infra text accompanying notes 182-84.
33. See Gilles & Friedman, supra note 18, at 626, 632, 633-34 (discussing multiple purposes
of class actions). The extent to which class actions actually deter companies from engaging in
misconduct is contested. Compare Elizabeth Chamblee Burch, CAFA’s Impact on Litigation as a
Public Good, 29 CARDOZO L. REV. 2517, 2517–18 (2008) (“corporate officers and directors
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This Article explores the viability of replacing consumer class actions
with individualized consumer arbitration in four parts. Section I examines
the existing landscape of consumer arbitration and finds that although
millions upon millions of consumer disputes are covered by arbitration
clauses, almost no consumers assert their claims in arbitration. When
consumers are aware they have claims and feel competent to bring claims
on their own behalf they typically do so by contacting customer service, or
seeking a chargeback with their credit card company, rather than by filing a
claim in arbitration. Yet, some will suggest that even if many consumers
are not currently bringing claims in arbitration, consumer arbitration could
be modified to make it more hospitable to consumer claims, perhaps by
using the Internet. To explore the question of whether arbitration could be
modified to make it more attractive to consumer claimants Section II
provides a taxonomy of consumer claims. It argues that while individual
arbitration  may  work  well  for  “procedurally  easy”  claims,  it  does  not  work  
well for those many consumer claims   that   are   “procedurally   difficult”  
(specifically claims of which individual consumers are not aware or that
they cannot reasonably present on their own). Section III then examines
what kinds of processes might be useful to permit consumers to present
“procedurally   difficult”   claims.      Finally,   Section   IV   concludes   that  
procedurally difficult consumer claims cannot realistically be presented by
individual consumers in arbitration, or in other settings. Thus, it suggests
that to the extent we care about procedurally difficult consumer claims we
should either resurrect consumer class actions or increase the funding for
government agencies that might realistically present such claims.
Admittedly, this Article does not address two issues that some may see
as central. First, it takes as a given that it is worthwhile enforcing laws that
give rise to procedurally difficult claims. Second, it also takes as a given
agonize less over the Securities Exchange Commission than over potential securities fraud class
actions; pharmaceutical companies worry less about the Federal Drug Administration’s postapproval monitoring than about products liability class actions; and the Federal Trade
Commission is less threatening to companies apt to ignore fair credit reporting requirements than
the class action bar.”), Myriam Gilles & Gary B. Friedman, Exploding the Class Action Agency
Costs Myth: The Social Utility of Entrepreneurial Lawyers, 155 U. PENN. L. REV. 103, 106 (2006)
(stating that the Federal Trade Commission is less feared than class actions), and James D. Cox &
Randall S. Thomas, Public and Private Enforcement of the Securities Laws: Have Things
Changed Since Enron?, 80 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 893, 894 (2005) (“So robust is the securities
class action that with great confidence the attorney can advise her client that one is far more likely
to encounter the plaintiffs’ securities class action lawyer than SEC enforcement personnel.”), with
Daniel Fisher, Will the Government Protect You from Arbitration Clauses? FORBES (Apr. 26,
2012, 11:08 AM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/danielfisher/2012/04/26/will-the-governmentprotect-you-from-arbitration-clauses/ (quoting banking attorney Alan Kaplinsky as stating that the
CFPB itself has “almost unlimited resources” to rein in his clients, and that his “clients are a lot
more scared about what the CFPB might be doing than being sued in a class action.”).
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that the benefits of class actions outweigh their costs. While some may
disagree with either or both of these positions, Congress and state
legislatures have already spoken on these issues. Federal and state
legislation gives rise to procedurally difficult claims and federal and state
bodies have adopted rules of civil procedure authorizing class actions.34 If
as a society we wish to revoke this legislation or eliminate class actions we
should do so explicitly, rather than allow companies to use arbitration to
eliminate legal protections or class actions surreptitiously.35
II. THE MYTH AND REALITY OF CONSUMER ARBITRATION
It is often asserted that arbitration offers a quicker and cheaper form of
dispute resolution.36 All else equal, a quicker and cheaper dispute
resolution process would certainly be a good thing for consumers, so at first
glance the appeal of arbitration as a venue for resolution of consumer
claims is quite understandable. Yet, as discussed below it turns out that at
least to date very few consumers seem to be choosing to resolve their
claims   through   arbitration.      While   we   don’t   have   as   much or as good
empirical information as would be desirable regarding how many
consumers choose to resolve their disputes through arbitration, we do have
some signposts, and they all point in the same direction. Although many
consumers are covered by mandatory arbitration clauses, very few actually
file arbitration claims.37 Surely this apparent fact at least calls into question
the idea that individual arbitration is a desirable venue for the resolution of
many consumer claims?
A. The Incidence of Mandatory Arbitration Clauses
Anecdotal information regarding the high incidence of mandatory
arbitration clauses in the consumer context is abundant. Were each of us to
engage in a systematic examination of our own consumer status we would
typically find that we are required to arbitrate disputes by credit card
providers,38 banks,39 discount lenders,40 and cell phone providers.41 As
34. Fed. R. Civ. P. 23.
35. See Jean R. Sternlight, Creeping Mandatory Arbitration: Is it Just?, 57 STANFORD L.
REV. 1631 (2005).
36. See, e.g., AT&T Mobility v. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740, 1751 (2011) (citing benefits of
arbitration as including informality, efficiency, cost-effectiveness and procedural flexibility).
37. See infra Part II.B.
38. Peter B. Rutledge & Christopher R. Drahozal, Contract and Choice 5 (Georgia Law,
Working Paper No. 79, 2012), available at http://digitalcommons.law.uga.edu/fac_wp/79
(concluding that as of December 31, 2009 95% of credit card loans were held by firms which
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well, we know that arbitration is often imposed on us as consumers when
we purchase or rent certain products (e.g. computers,42 items bought
through Amazon43 or Zappos,44 Starbucks gift cards,45 or rental
equipment46), enroll in schools,47 rent movies,48 or purchase auto parts.49

mandated customers resolve future disputes through arbitration). See also Consumer Credit Card
Customer Agreement & Disclosure Statement, WELLS FARGO 1, https://www.wellsfargo.com/
downloads/pdf/credit_cards/agreements/wf_cash_back_card.pdf (last visited Aug. 25, 2012).
39. See PEW HEALTH GRP., supra note 7, at 18 (reporting that out of 265 bank accounts
examined about 71% of accountholders were required to agree to have disputes resolved before a
private arbitrator of the bank’s choice, and that 94% of accountholders were required to waive the
right to a class action).
40. See, e.g., Buckeye Check Cashing v. Cardegna, 546 U.S. 440, 447-49 (2006); King v.
Advance Am., 415 F. App’x. 399, 401 (3rd Cir. 2011).
41. AT&T Mobility v. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740, 744 (2011); Pendergast v. Sprint
Solutions, Inc., 592 F.3d 1119, 1121-23 (11th Cir. 2010).
42. E.g., Dell Consumer Hardware Service Agreement, DELL 1, http://i.dell.com/sites/
content/shared-content/solutions/en/Documents/consumer-hardware-services-contract-12_8_2011
.pdf (last visited June 25, 2012) (requiring individual arbitration of warranty claims brought
against Dell). See also Toshiba Terms and Conditions of Sale, TOSHIBA 2, http://www.
toshibadirect.com/td/b2c/legalstmt.to (last visited June 25, 2012) (containing Toshiba computers
terms of sale requiring customers to resolve claims through binding arbitration and waive right to
participate in a class action); Microsoft To Ban Class Actions, LEGAL SKILLS PROF BLOG 1
http://lawprofessors.typepad.com/legal_skills/2012/06/microsoft-to-ban-class-actions.html (stating
Microsoft currently is in the process of compelling customers to give up the right to class actions).
43. See Amazon Conditions of Use, AMAZON.COM 3 (June 25, 2012), http://www.amazon.
com/gp/help/customer/display.html/ref=footer_cou?ie=UTF8&nodeId=508088 (mandating arbitration and prohibiting class or consolidated claims).
44. See Zappos.com Terms of Use, ZAPPOS.COM 2, http://www.zappos.com/terms-of-use (last
visited June 25, 2012) (requiring consumers to bring any claims against Zappos in arbitration and
prohibiting use of class actions by consumers, but reserving to Zappos the right to sue a consumer
in court for violating intellectual property rights).
45. See Starbucks Card Terms & Conditions, STARBUCKS 4-5, https://www.starbucks.com/
card/card-terms-and-conditions (last visited June 25, 2012).
46. See, e.g., U-Haul Arbitration agreement, U-HAUL 1, http://www.uhaul.com/arbitration/
(last visited June 25, 2012) (containing terms requiring U-Haul equipment renters to accept
mandatory arbitration and waive right to participate in class action).
47. See, e.g., University of Phoenix Consumer Information Guide 2011–2012, UNIVERSITY
OF
PHOENIX
81-89,
http://cdn.assets-phoenix.net/content/dam/altcloud/doc/about_uopx/
University-of-Phoenix-Consumer-Information-Guide-2011-2012.pdf, (last visited June 25, 2012)
(requiring University of Phoenix students to bring any claims using binding arbitration and to
waive right to class action).
48. See Blockbuster Terms and Conditions of Use, BLOCKBUSTER 6, http://www.blockbuster.
com/corporate/termsAndConditions#disputeResolution (last visited June 25, 2012) (requiring all
disputes arising from Blockbuster transactions to be resolved by binding arbitration without
participation in class action or class-wide arbitration).
49. See PepBoys Terms & Conditions, PEPBOYS 1, http://www.pepboys.com/customer_care/
policies/terms?CID=FtrMain_AbtPBTOU_P2 (last visited June 25, 2012) (requiring binding
arbitration and prohibiting class action for any dispute arising from use of Pepboys’ website or a
purchase from the online store). The Consumer Attorneys Report, supra note 3, at 2–3, provides a
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Perhaps companies will soon be permitted to use arbitration clauses to
eliminate securities fraud class actions as well.50
Unfortunately, however, more exact empirical measures of the
incidence of mandatory consumer arbitration are far harder to come by. For
this reason the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau,51 tasked under the
Dodd-Frank Financial Protection Act52 with studying and potentially
regulating  mandatory  arbitration  “between  covered  persons  and  consumers  
in connection with the offering or providing of consumer financial products
or   services,”53 has recently issued a request for information asking
interested parties to provide suggestions for how the agency might learn
about the prevalence of pre-dispute arbitration agreements.54
We do have a few snippets of intriguing information that imply that the
incidence of mandatory arbitration clauses in the consumer setting is very
high. For example, in 2004 Linda Demaine and Deborah Hensler published
an article examining the extent to which  a  hypothetical  “average  Joe”  in  Los  
Angeles was likely to be subject to mandatory consumer arbitration
clauses.55 They   looked   at   67   industries   with   which   “Joe”   might   have  
relationships and found that the incidence of arbitration in those industries
ranged from zero to sixty-seven percent.56
Other empirical studies have focused on particular types of consumer
contracts. Professor Ted Eisenberg and his co-authors found that seventy
five percent of studied financial services and telecommunications
companies used arbitration clauses in their consumer agreements, and that

long list of some of the kinds of consumer contracts in which mandatory arbitration clauses
appear.
50. See Daniel J. Morrissey, Will Arbitration End Securities Litigation? 9-10 (Gonzaga Univ.
Sch. of Law, Legal Studies Research Paper No. 2012-4, 2012), available at http://ssrn.com/
abstract=2048707 (arguing that companies should not be permitted to use arbitration clauses to
eliminate securities fraud class actions, stating that it is not feasible for consumers to bring such
actions individually, and that the SEC is also not capable of conducting all necessary enforcement
actions).
51. CONSUMER FINANCIAL PROTECTION BUREAU, http://www.consumerfinance.gov/ (last
visited June 25, 2012).
52. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Financial Protection Act, 12 U.S.C. §
5301 (Supp. IV 2006).
53. 12 U.S.C. § 5518.
54. Request for Information Regarding Scope, Methods, and Data Sources for Conducting
Study of Pre-Dispute Arbitration Agreements, 77 Fed. Reg. 25148 (Apr. 27, 2012).
55. Linda J. Demaine & Deborah R. Hensler, Volunteering to Arbitrate Through Predispute
Arbitration Clauses: The Average Consumer’s Experience, 67 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 55
(2004).
56. Id. at 63.
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all of these contracts included arbitral class action waivers.57 With respect
to credit cards, Peter Rutledge and Christopher Drahozal concluded that as
of December 31, 2009, ninety-five percent of credit card loans were held by
firms which mandated customers resolve future disputes through
arbitration,58 though that percentage dropped dramatically to forty-eight
percent as of December 2010 because one major issuer was pressured into
an antitrust settlement under which it agreed to suspend use of the
mandatory arbitration clauses. 59
While much empirical work remains to be done regarding the use of
arbitration clauses in the consumer context,60 based on both existing studies
and anecdotal information it seems clear that millions upon millions of
potential consumer disputes are covered by arbitration clauses. The United
States census data shows that as of 2010 there were approximately
234,564,000 residents in the U.S., age eighteen or over.61 It seems
reasonable to assume that each of those persons was covered on average by
at least three consumer contracts including mandatory arbitration
provisions. As noted above these could include credit card agreements,
bank deposition agreements, car loans, cell phone contracts, cable television
contracts, rental agreements, insurance contracts, certain on-line purchases,
57. Theodore Eisenberg et al., Arbitration’s Summer Soldiers, 41 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 871,
882–84 (2008). Cf. Christopher R. Drahozal & Stephen J. Ware, Why Do Businesses Use (or Not
Use) Arbitration Clauses?, 25 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RES. 433 (2010) (critiquing Eisenberg et al for
certain of their broad conclusions but accepting their empirical results for the industries that were
studied).
58. Peter B. Rutledge & Christopher R. Drahozal, Contract and Choice 5 (Georgia Law,
Working Paper No. 79, 2012), available at http://digitalcommons.law.uga.edu/fac_wp/79.
59. Id. at 5, 9. The authors also found that nearly 95% of the arbitration clauses sampled
included class waivers, and that this figure rose to 99% when measuring by loan volume rather
than by firms. They examined 293 credit card agreements submitted by the issuers to the Federal
Reserve. See also Amy Schmitz, Legislating in the Light: Considering Empirical Data in
Crafting Arbitration Reforms, 15 HARV. NEGOT. L. REV. 115, 146 (2010) (finding, in small
empirical study, that 7 of 13 credit card agreements required consumers to bring claims in
arbitration, and that all of these precluded class or consolidated proceedings).
60. Indeed, Congress in the Consumer Financial Protection Act of 2010 ordered the new
Consumer Financial Protection Board to conduct such a study, Consumer Financial Protection
Act, 12 U.S.C.A. § 5518(a), and they have commenced to do this work. Consumer Financial
Protection Bureau launches public inquiry into arbitration clauses, CONSUMER FINANCIAL
PROTECTION BUREAU (Apr. 24, 2012), http://www.consumerfinance.gov/pressreleases/consumerfinancial-protection-bureau-launches-public-inquiry-into-arbitration-clauses/.
It would be
interesting to know both how many consumers and how many consumer transactions are covered
by mandatory arbitration provisions. Apart from the predictable quibbles among empiricists as to
the validity of individual studies, it is clear that no empiricists have yet studied the bulk of
consumer transactions in this country. For a collection of the comments submitted in response to
the CFPB’s request for suggestions on how to study consumer arbitration see supra note 3.
61. U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, RESIDENT POPULATION BY SEX AND AGE: 1980–2010 (2010),
available at http://www.census.gov/compendia/statab/2012/tables/12s0007.pdf.
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etc. Thus, it would seem that U.S. consumers are covered by over half a
billion contracts containing mandatory arbitration provisions. In short,
based on studies, anecdotes, and back of the envelope calculations it seems
that reasonable people could agree there are lots and lots of mandatory
consumer arbitration contracts in the United States at present.
B. The Extent to Which Consumers Bring Claims in Arbitration
Although, as set out above, a great many consumer transactions are
covered by mandatory arbitration provisions, remarkably few consumers
bring claims against companies in arbitration. Once again, while the
empirical record is incomplete, the information available from a variety of
sources all points in the same direction: consumers almost never initiate
individual claims against companies in arbitration.
Some   of   our   limited   data   regarding   consumers’   tendency   to   file  
individual claims against companies in arbitration comes from arbitration
providers. In the United States there are presently two major arbitration
providers:   the   American   Arbitration   Association   (“AAA”)62 and JAMS.63
Neither handles more than a miniscule number of consumer claims,
particularly by comparison to the numbers of consumers covered by
arbitration clauses, to the numbers of consumers who bring claims in other
venues, or to the numbers of consumers at least formerly covered by class
actions.64

62. See AMERICAN ARBITRATION ASSOCIATION, http://www.adr.org (last visited Aug. 25,
2012).
63. Although JAMS once stood for Judicial Arbitration and Mediation Service, JAMS is no
longer an acronym. JAMS ARBITRATION, MEDIATION, AND ADR SERVICES, http://www.jamsadr
.com (last visited Aug. 25, 2012).
64. A third major provider, the National Arbitration Forum, used to exist, but was effectively
driven out of business when it was sued by the Minnesota Attorney General. “On July 14, 2009,
the Minnesota Attorney General brought a complaint in Hennepin County against NAF alleging
consumer fraud act and deceptive trade practices act violations and false advertising. NAF settled
that litigation less than a week later, agreeing to cease performing consumer arbitrations and
entering into a consent judgment to that effect with the Minnesota Attorney General.” See In re
Natl. Arbitration Forum Trade Practices Litig., 704 F. Supp. 2d 832, 835 (D. Minn. 2010). NAF,
at the time, was primarily handling arbitrations brought by lenders against consumers as a
collection tool. The Minnesota AG’s lawsuit alleged that far from being neutral, NAF had an
intertwined business relationship with some of the very companies that were bringing collections
claims against consumers. For general discussion of the NAF fiasco see Nancy A. Welsh, What is
“(Im)partial Enough” in a World of Embedded Neutrals?, 52 ARIZ. L. REV. 391, 427–31 (2010).
Although millions of consumers were covered by clauses naming NAF as the arbitration provider,
and although this entity handled 50,000 consumer debt collection actions per year, only 226
consumers brought claims against companies through NAF during a four-year period. ERNST &
YOUNG, OUTCOMES OF ARBITRATION: AN EMPIRICAL STUDY OF CONSUMER LENDING CASES
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JAMS is an ADR provider that specializes in higher-end, i.e. more
complicated and more expensive disputes.65 JAMS arbitrators and
mediators are typically retired judges or attorneys with a great deal of
practice experience.66 These neutrals often charge hundreds of dollars per
hour for their services.67 Thus, it is not surprising that few consumers
choose to file arbitration claims with JAMS. JAMS Executive Vice
President and General Counsel Jay Welsh reported to this author that JAMS
handles at most a few hundred consumer arbitration claims.68 He further
explained that most of these are from claims alleging that certain credit card
companies violated federal collections statutes, asserted to fend off potential
collections actions by those companies.69 The AAA handles a broader
range of disputes than does JAMS, but even AAA handles quite few claims
brought by consumers against companies. While precise numbers are hard
to obtain,70 in one informal report AAA stated it handled roughly 1,000
claims by consumers per year.71
The same story—relatively few individual consumers bring claims in
arbitration—is supported by data revealed in several lawsuits72 and by
statements of individual attorneys as well. For example financial institution
(2004), available at http://www.adrforum.com/rcontrol/documents/ResearchStudiesAndStatistics/
2005ErnstAndYoung.pdf.
65. See About JAMS, JAMS ARBITRATION, MEDIATION, AND ADR SERVICES 1,
http://www.jamsadr.com/aboutus_overview/ (last visited Aug. 25, 2012) (“JAMS is the largest
private alternative dispute resolution (ADR) provider in the world. With its prestigious panel of
neutrals, JAMS specializes in mediating and arbitrating complex, multi-party,
business/commercial cases . . . .”).
66. Id.
67. See PUBLIC CITIZEN, THE COSTS OF ARBITRATION (April 2002), available at
http://www.citizen.org/documents/ACF110A.PDF 44 (reporting JAMS’ estimate that its
arbitrators charge between $150 and $300 per hour, in addition to a daily $250 case management
fee).
68. Telephone interview with Jay Welsh, JAMS General Counsel (Apr. 23, 2012).
69. Id.
70. The author attempted to obtain more precise numbers from AAA but has not, to date,
been successful.
71. NATIONAL ROUNDTABLE ON CONSUMER AND EMPLOYMENT DISPUTE RESOLUTION,
CONSUMER ARBITRATION ROUNDTABLE SUMMARY REPORT Attachment D, at 48 (2012),
available at http://law.psu.edu/_file/YAM/YAM_National_Roundtable_Summary%20Report.pdf
[hereinafter ROUNDTABLE SUMMARY REPORT].
72. E.g. Coneff v. AT&T Mobility, 620 F. Supp. 2d 1248, 1258 (W.D. Wash. 2009) (finding
only an “infinitesimal” proportion of customers had brought claims in either arbitration or small
claims court), reversed on grounds this was irrelevant in light of FAA preference for arbitration,
673 F.3d 1155 (9th Cir. 2012); Reuter v. Davis, No. 502001CA001164XXXXMB, 2006 WL
3743016, at *4-5 (Fla. Cir. Ct. Dec. 12, 2006) (observing that consumers had not filed individual
claims in arbitration because “the wages and out of pocket costs lost in prosecuting [individual]
claims dwarf the amounts sought” and therefore finding class action waivers to be
unconscionable).
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First USA revealed in discovery that in the two years after it implemented
its mandatory arbitration clause in early 1998 only four customers filed
claims against the company.73 As well, discovery produced in three class
action lawsuits against three payday loan businesses revealed that no
arbitrations had been filed against any of the three lenders,74 even though
the three classes covered hundreds of thousands of payday loan customers
allegedly charged illegal fees and interest rates.75 Similarly, a law firm
responding to the CFPB Request for Information pertaining to how to study
pre-dispute arbitration agreements reported that in cases involving
“hundreds  of  thousands  of  consumers  we  have  never  discovered  evidence  of  
a   single   arbitration   being   initiated.”76 And, affidavits submitted in AT&T
Mobility v. Concepcion stated  that  “[f]ewer  than  200  of  AT&T’s  millions  of  
customers brought claims in individual arbitration against the company for
any reason, [compared to thousands who sought help from a consumer
group for the specific claims alleged in Coneff.]”77
In sum, although millions of consumers, and more millions of
consumer claims are covered by mandatory arbitration provisions, at most a
few thousand consumers seem to bring claims in arbitration. This author
suggests that the small number of claims brought by consumers in

73. In contrast, First USA itself filed 51,622 arbitration claims against consumers in the same
period. See Caroline E. Mayer, Win Some, Lose Rarely?: Arbitration Forum’s Rulings Called
One-Sided, WASH. POST, Mar. 1, 2000, at 2, available at 2000 WLNR 10701587.
74. JUSTICE DENIED, supra note 6, at 19. The Public Citizen Report cites a court order in
Hager v. Check Into Cash of North Carolina, 652 S.E.2d 263 (N.C. 2007) available at
http://www.nccheckintocashsettlement.com/pdf/Hager_OrderreArbitration.pdf (order denying
motion to compel arbitration and stay proceedings, stating that interrogatories revealed that no
arbitrations had been filed in North Carolina against any of the three payday lenders sued in class
actions). See also Order in Kucan v. Advance America, No. 04-CVS-2860, 2009 WL 2115349
para. 50 (N.C. Super. Ct. June 16, 2009) (stating record revealed “there ha[d] never been an
arbitration proceeding arising from this business” despite “the large number” of loans).
75. JUSTICE DENIED, supra note 6, at 18. See also McQuillan v. Check ‘N Go of North
Carolina, Inc., 636 S.E.2d 807 (N.C. 2006), available at http://www.nccgsettlement.com (order
denying motion to compel arbitration, stating that company had issued almost 160,000 loans with
allegedly illegal fees per year for four years prior to initiation of lawsuit).
76. Chavez & Gertler LLP, Comments to Bureau of Consumer Financial Protection (June 19,
2012) (discussing Docket No. CFPB-2012-0017). Another firm responding to the CFPB request
stated that although thousands and perhaps even millions of Wachovia Bank customers
complained of their overdraft fees, from 2003–2008 none ever pursued a claim regarding those
fees in arbitration. Statement of Robert C. Gilbert, Plaintiffs’ Coordinating Counsel, Grossman
Roth, P.A. 8-9 (June 22, 2012) (discussing Docket No. CFPB-2012-0017 and observing that
although hundreds of thousands of customers complained to Wells Fargo about its overdraft fees,
just one filed an arbitration, and that one paid more than the amount in dispute to bring the claim
to arbitration).
77. Brief of Marygrace Coneff, et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioners at 9, AT&T
Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740 (2011) (No. 09-893), 2010 WL 3973886.
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arbitration may show that arbitration is not, in fact, an ideal forum for many
consumer claims.
C. Why  Don’t  More  Consumers  Bring  Claims  in  Arbitration?
Before one jumps to a conclusion that individualized arbitration is not a
good  forum  for  individual  consumers’  claims  one  must  explore  at  least  two  
alternative  explanations.    First,  perhaps  consumers  simply  don’t  have  many  
claims. If consumers are not aggrieved there is no reason for them to bring
claims in arbitration or anywhere else. Surely we do not want to encourage
claiming (or griping) merely for the sake of claiming. Second, even if it
may be true that arbitration is not, currently, an ideal forum in which
consumers might file their claims, perhaps with some fairly minor
“tinkering”   we   might   improve   the   suitability   of   the   arbitral   forum.      We  
explore these alternative explanations below.
1.

Do Consumers Simply Not Have Claims or Grievances?

Some may contend that consumers simply do not have claims or
grievances, but the empirical record suggests otherwise. While few
consumers are filing claims in arbitration, many consumers are claiming,
grieving, or griping in other settings. For example, major on-line vendor
eBay and payment collection service PayPal report handling sixty million
consumer disputes in a given year.78 (This is not a typo!) Consumers also
make complaints directly to various government agencies, such as the
Federal Trade Commission.79 The FTC handled nearly 1.8 million
complaints in 2011.80 As well, consumers may make complaints to their
78. Colin Rule, Quantifying the Economic Benefits of Effective Redress: Large E-Commerce
Data Sets and the Cost-Benefit Case for Investing in Dispute Resolution, 34 U. ARK. LITTLE
ROCK L. REV. (forthcoming 2012) (manuscript at 2) (on file with author). Note that author Colin
Rule was the Director of Online Dispute Resolution for eBay and PayPal from 2003–2011. Id.
The article reports on an empirical study concluding that customers who had a dispute handled
through the eBay or PayPal online dispute resolution system were more likely to make future
purchases through the company, whether or not they won their claim. Perhaps not surprisingly
those who got favorable results increased their purchase rate even more than those who got
unfavorable results. Only when the dispute resolution process was frustratingly slow were users
less likely to make future purchases through the company. Rule hypothesizes that users who were
satisfied with the dispute resolution process, whether or not they won their claim, had increased
trust in the system and thus felt more comfortable making future purchases through the company.
Id.
79. For discussion of the history and role of the FTC see FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION,
http://ftc.gov (last viewed Aug. 25, 2012). The FTC derives its authority from the Federal Trade
Commission Act, 15 U.S.C. § 41 (2006).
80. FTC Releases Top Complaint Categories of 2011, FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION (Feb.
28, 2012), http://ftc.gov/opa/2012/02/2011complaints.shtm.
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credit card company, for purchases made on the card, seeking that the
charges be reversed if a product or service did not meet expectations.81
This   practice,   called   “chargebacks,”   is   used   quite   frequently   by  
consumers.82 Indeed, while estimates of the number of chargebacks are
hard   to   find,   one   source   reported   “[c]hargebacks   currently   average   about  
two-tenths of a percent . . . of overall transaction volume. That means there
are about 30 million chargebacks per year in the  United  States.”83 Another
commentator   “conservatively”   estimated   that   consumers   make $15 billion
of chargebacks per year.84 In short, we can see that the low number of
claims filed by consumers in arbitration is not likely due to the fact that no
consumers are dissatisfied with products or services they receive. Finally,
consumers often present claims simply by calling a customer service
number, and may informally get relief in that fashion.85
It is also significant to consider how many consumers at least used to
be covered by class actions.86
Examples:
 Two California lawsuits brought against Career Education Corp., for
making fraudulent representations as to post-school employment
prospects, lead to settlement of $40 million whereby the company
agreed to reimburse 8,500 students up to $20,000 apiece;87
 Wolf v. Nissan Motor Acceptance Corp.,88 a suit on behalf of
members of the armed service regarding car leases, would have

81. Neil M. Peretz, The Single Euro Payment Area: A New Opportunity for Consumer
Alternative Dispute Resolution in the European Union, 16 MICH. ST. J. INTL L. 573, 585 (2008)
(citing Mark Betz, Chargebacks and Consumer Behavior, TRANSACTION WORLD (Oct. 2003)),
http://web.archive.org/web/20050323104030/http:/www.transactionworld.net/articles/2003/Octob
er/coverstory.asp.
82. Id. at 582-83 n.48, 585-86.
83. Id. at 585.
84. TOM CAIN, RISKY BUSINESS: BEST PRACTICES FOR MANAGING CARDHOLDER DISPUTES
AND CHARGEBACK PROCESSING IN CHALLENGING TIMES 2 (2008), available at
http://www.tsys.com/Downloads/upload/TSYS-WP-DisputeChargeback.pdf.
85. For example, cell phone carrier AT&T Mobility “dispensed over $1.3 billion in credits
for customer concerns and complaints” between February 2007 and January 2008. Opening Brief
of AT&T Mobility LLC at 10, Laster et al. v. AT&T Mobility LLC, No. 08-56394 (9th Cir. Jan. 5,
2009), 2009 WL 2494186.
86. One law firm alone states that while in the past it has represented “tens of millions of
Americans who have been the victims of corporate fraud and wrongdoing in hundreds of
consumer protection lawsuits,” after Concepcion, many of its successes might no longer be
possible. Letter from David Stellings, Lieff, Cabraser, Heimann & Bernstein, to Monica Jackson,
Executive Secretary, Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (June 22, 2012), available at
http://www.regulations.gov/#!documentDetail;D=CFPB-2012-0017-0052.
87. JUSTICE DENIED, supra note 6, at 10.
88. No. 10-3338, 2012 WL 1079340, at *2, *6 (D. N.J. Mar. 29, 2012).
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included more than 1,000 service members but was defeated when
the court upheld the arbitral class action ban;89
 Three lawsuits brought against some North Carolina payday lenders
included approximately 350,000 class members. These class
members received payments ranging from $10 to hundreds of
dollars;90
 Curry v. Fairbanks Capital Corp., a claim brought on behalf of
approximately 600,000 consumers alleging pattern and practice of
unlawful/deceptive practices regarding servicing of residential
mortgage loans, settled in 2003 simultaneous with agreements with
FTC and HUD, helped transform Fairbanks’   mortgage   servicing  
procedures and also provided monetary relief;91
 Class action suits brought on behalf of over a million AfricanAmerican and Latino car buyers with respect to discriminatory auto
lending yielded settlements providing non-monetary relief;92
 A class action suit against American Honda Motor Company, due to
misrepresenting the gas mileage of their Civic Hybrid cars to
consumers, led to a settlement giving 200,000 Civic Hybrid owners
$100 to $200 plus a rebate if they purchased new Honda vehicles.93
 A multi-district class action brought against more than fifty banks
claimed that they used improper practices to maximize overdraft
fees  at  their  customers’  expense.94
Thus, it is clear that consumers do in fact suffer wrongs, even though
they don’t  typically  file  claims  in  arbitration.
2. Can We Redesign Arbitration to Make it More Hospitable to
Consumer Claims?
Some might consider the information provided above and use it to
argue that we can redesign arbitration processes to make them more
hospitable to consumer claims. If millions upon millions of consumers are
filing claims with eBay and PayPal perhaps we just need to make
89. JUSTICE DENIED, supra note 6, at 14–15.
90. Id. at 20.
91. See Settlement Agreement and Release, Curry et al. v. Fairbanks Capital Corp., No. 0310895-DPW 1-4 (Dist. Mass. Nov. 14, 2003), available at http://www.ftc.gov/bcp/cases/
fairbanks/classact_agrmt.pdf.
92. JUSTICE DENIED, supra note 6, at 23–25.
93. Honda Wins Reversal of Civic Hybrid Small-Claims Judgment, HUFFINGTON POST (Apr.
20, 2012), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2012/04/20/honda-hybrid-lawsuit_n_1441913.html.
94. See Statement of Robert C. Gilbert, supra note 76. Although the statement does not
specifically mention how many bank customers would have been represented in these cases,
clearly the number is huge.
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arbitration cheaper and more accessible in order to find a good substitute for
class actions. For example, Professor Amy Schmitz has urged that by
improving on-line dispute resolution processes we can greatly assist
consumers who wish to present claims effectively,95 and has suggested that
on-line dispute resolution can be superior to either beefed up government
regulation or costly litigation.96
This question of whether and how consumer dispute resolution might
be redesigned is very current. Beginning in mid-2011 some academics and
legal practitioners attended a Roundtable Discussion geared to foster a
“structured,   facilitated discussion among thoughtful people about the
current state of U.S. policy and practice regarding consumer and
employment   dispute   resolution.”97 The group, including this author,
gathered for three days in February 2012 to consider what we know about
the resolution of consumer disputes in the United States, what else we
would like to know, and how we might improve how consumer disputes are
currently resolved.98 The topic of consumer dispute resolution is receiving
a great deal of attention in Europe as well.99
To some extent it is no doubt true that we can design consumer
arbitration processes more effectively, and that such system redesigns will,
in some instances, allow individual consumers to file individual claims that
might not otherwise have been possible. Systems designers might take into
account a variety of factors in trying to construct a process that is
sufficiently accessible, efficient and just.100 They could try to ensure that
95. Amy J. Schmitz, Access to Consumer Remedies in the Squeaky Wheel System, 39 PEPP.
L. REV. 279, 324 (2012) [hereinafter Schmitz, Access to Consumer Remedies]; Amy J. Schmitz,
“Drive-Thru” Arbitration in the Digital Age: Empowering Consumers Through Binding ODR, 62
BAYLOR L. REV. 178, 205–06 (2010) [hereinafter Schmitz, “Drive-Thru” Arbitration].
96. Schmitz, Access to Consumer Remedies, supra note 95, at 330.
97. See ROUNDTABLE SUMMARY REPORT, supra note 71, at 4. Although participants in the
Roundtable agreed that the proceedings would be covered by modified “Chatham House Rules”
on confidentiality, whereby specific remarks cannot be attributed to particular attendees, neither
the identities of the attendees nor the general subjects discussed are protected by confidentiality.
Id. at 5.
98. This Article is in part inspired by those discussions, and designed to contribute to that
enterprise.
99. See European Commission, Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of
the Council on Alternative Dispute Resolution for Consumer Disputes and Amending Regulation
(EC) No. 2006/2004 and Directive 2009/22/EC (Directive on consumer ADR) COM (2011) 793
final (Nov. 29, 2011), available at http://ec.europa.eu/consumers/redress_cons/docs/directive_
adr_en.pdf.
100. See, e.g., LISA BLOMGREN BINGHAM, JANET K. MARTINEZ, AND STEPHANIE SMITH,
DISPUTE SYSTEMS DESIGN: PREVENTING, MANAGING, AND RESOLVING CONFLICT (Menlo Park,
CA: Stanford University Press, forthcoming 2012). See also Schmitz, “Drive-Thru” Arbitration,
supra note 95, at 223 (urging that ODR should be convenient, cost-effective, engender trust, and
provide expertise); Thomas J. Stipanowich, The Third Arbitration Trilogy: Stolt-Nielsen, Rent-a-
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consumers can file claims in arbitration without paying a high (or perhaps
any) filing fee, without leaving the comfort of their home (on-line), and
without having to negotiate complicated forms. Some may suggest that
once we develop a system that would allow consumers to file claims
cheaply and easily on their own, class actions will not be needed.101
Unfortunately, while I believe that on-line dispute resolution systems can be
very useful, and that they can provide great improvements over existing
dispute resolution systems, I do not believe they can adequately resolve
many of the kinds of consumer problems currently being handled by class
actions, for the reasons set out in Sections III and IV.
III. A TAXONOMY—TWO TYPES OF CONSUMER CLAIMS
As we examine whether individual arbitrations can provide an adequate
substitute for consumer class actions it is helpful to consider two main
categories of consumer claims.102 I have devised a taxonomy to distinguish
two   categories:   “procedurally   easy”   (“PE”)   and   “procedurally   difficult”  
(“PD”).    These  names  are  meant  to  illustrate  that  certain consumer claims,
apart from their merits or likelihood of success, are harder to identify and
present than are others.103
center, Concepcion and the Future of American Arbitration, 22 AM. REV. INT’L ARB. 323, 427–34
(2012), available at http://ssrn.com/abs=1919936 (considering means of making consumer
arbitration more fair and just).
101. Amy Schmitz at least comes close to taking this position. Urging that “the internet and
computer-mediated communication provide hope for consumers to break free from the barriers of
the squeaky wheel system [whereby only some consumers make complaints and receive relief],”
Schmitz urges further reliance on online dispute resolution to “increase consumers’ awareness and
remedy resources without increasing litigation or government oversight that will augment public
and private costs.” Schmitz, Access to Consumer Remedies, supra note 95, at 319, 330.
102. This Article will not consider the potential benefits of arbitration as a means for
companies to bring claims against consumers. We saw, in the NAF era, that arbitration could be
immensely popular as a means for companies to bring collections actions against consumers. Two
reports by Public Citizen showed that companies were, during that era, filing thousands upon
thousands of claims against consumers in arbitration and generally enjoying great success.
PUBLIC CITIZEN, THE ARBITRATION TRAP: HOW CREDIT CARD COMPANIES ENSNARE
CONSUMERS (2007), available at http://www.citizen.org/documents/ArbitrationTrap.pdf; PUBLIC
CITIZEN, THE COSTS OF ARBITRATION (2003), available at http://www.citizen.org/
documents/ACF110A.PDF. See also FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION, REPAIRING A BROKEN
SYSTEM: PROTECTING CONSUMERS IN DEBT COLLECTION LITIGATION AND ARBITRATION
(2010), available at http://www.ftc.gov/os/2010/07/debtcollectionreport.pdf. However, with the
demise of NAF it appears arbitration is no longer popular as a collection tool and, moreover, this
alternative use of arbitration is tangential to the question of whether individualized consumer
arbitration might serve as an adequate substitute for class actions. See supra note 64 for further
discussion of the demise of NAF.
103. See Chavez & Gertler LLP, supra note 76, at 3 (observing that while arbitration may be
an efficient tool to resolve certain individual claims “it is not an effective way to remedy business
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A. Procedurally Easy Claims
“Procedurally  easy”  claims  have  four  elements:104
(i) consumers know they have been harmed;
(ii) consumers know that the harm is possibly or likely legally
actionable;
(iii) the claim is not particularly complicated or costly to present,
relative to the likely recovery; and
(iv) the consumer seeks individualized monetary relief.
If any of these elements are not met a claim that would have been PE
likely becomes PD.
Let’s   consider   some   examples   of   “procedurally   easy”   claims.      The  
consumer bought a hair dryer at a local retail store that does not work. Or,
the consumer ordered a bicycle on-line that arrived in pieces or not at all.
Perhaps the consumer was charged for a long distance phone call to China
that she knows she did not make. Possibly the consumer was substantially
overcharged   by   her   dentist.      Or,   the   moving   company   broke   consumer’s  
antique dresser.
While the consumer might or might not prevail on these claims, they
are at least fairly easy to present from a procedural standpoint. In each
instance the consumer not only likely knows she was harmed, but also has
good reason to believe that harm was legally actionable. When a product
that is purchased does not work, arrives broken, or never arrives, the
consumer   knows   right   away   she   has   a   problem.      While   the   dentist’s   or  
phone  company’s  alleged  overcharges  may  not  be  noticed,  if  they  are  small,
a large overcharge will likely be caught. The consumer knows that

practices that commonly affect hundreds  or  thousands  of  consumers”). The mere fact that certain
consumer claims are difficult to present does not resolve the question of who should bring such
claims. Well-funded government agencies could help protect consumers with procedurally
difficult claims. See also J. Maria Glover, The Structural Role of Private Enforcement
Mechanisms in Public Law, 53 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1137, 1176–1217 (2012), available at
http://scholarship.law.wm.edu/wmlr/vol53/iss4/3 (exploring whether private parties, or instead
government regulators, are best positioned to present particular claims). Glover suggests that
public regulators will generally have “informational advantages” for claims such as those
pertaining to consumer finance or housing discrimination in which a “fairly large set of data is
needed for the illumination of potential wrongdoing, . . . comparative analysis of the factual
information is desirable; or the relevant information is complex and thus “not easily
understandable by non-experts.” Id. at 1180. Individuals, by contrast, may have a comparative
advantage to pursue a simpler claim such as whether they were denied overtime pay. Id. at 1183–
84. For a discussion of the possibility of beefed up government enforcement see infra Part IV.B.
104. A fifth element could be that the company has an incentive to please the consumer.
Companies that expect repeat business from customers or that fear customers may malign the
company’s reputation have good reason to accommodate the customer’s concerns, which means it
will be easier, procedurally, for the customer to present the claim and receive relief.
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products should arrive as promised, and should work or fit, and that service
providers should not overcharge, so she has a good sense that she may have
a viable legal claim when these aspirations are not met. As to presentation
and evidence, these claims are straightforward as well. The consumer
herself can explain or testify as to the nature of the problem. She can in
some cases use a photograph or video to document the claim. While a win
is not guaranteed, if the consumer is not believed, the consumer can at least
present her case, individually, reasonably effectively. Finally, the consumer
in these situations simply wants monetary or in-kind compensation.
Procedurally easy claims can be presented in various ways. Customers
can  simply  write  or  call  the  company’s  customer  service  department,  seek  
relief through their credit card provider (or in the case of the dentist their
health insurance company), or pursue arbitration or even small claims
litigation. The consumer merely needs a venue in which he or she can tell
the story. If, as is often the case, the company has an incentive to do right
by the consumer, such disputes can frequently be resolved by contacting
customer service.105 And, if the company is playing hardball the consumer
will often obtain relief through a chargeback or perhaps through arbitration
or small claims litigation.106
Of course, even procedurally easy claims are often not presented by
consumers who believe they have been wronged. As Amy Schmitz details
“[b]usinesses   understand   that   most   consumers   do   not   exert   the   time   and  
energy  necessary  to  pursue  their  purchase  complaints.”107 But, at least it is
not conceptually difficult to devise a system that will allow motivated
consumers to assert their claims. Most of the sixty million claims currently
being handled by eBay and PayPal on an annual basis108 are probably
procedurally easy.

105. As Amy Schmitz has explained, the squeaky wheels (here the consumers who take the
time to complain) often get the grease they demand. Schmitz, Access to Consumer Remedies,
supra note 95, at 280.
106. See supra text accompanying notes 81–84 for discussion of chargebacks. Of course
small claims court is another venue in which consumers can potentially explore their claims.
107. Schmitz, Access to Consumer Remedies, supra note 95, at 291 (attributing some of
consumers’ failure to raise claims to inertia, over-optimism and rule-following tendencies). See
also Arthur Best & Alan R. Andreasen, Consumer Response to Unsatisfactory Purchases: A
Survey of Perceiving Defects, Voicing Complaints, and Obtaining Redress, 11 LAW & SOC’Y
REV. 701, 712 (1976) (concluding that only 39.7% of customers surveyed took some kind of
action to complain about perceived problems).
108. See Rule, supra note 78 and accompanying text.
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B. Procedurally Difficult Claims
1. The Nature of Procedurally Difficult Claims
Procedurally difficult claims, in turn, present greater problems. Such
claims possess one or more of the following elements:
(i) the consumer does not realize she has potentially been injured;
(ii) the consumer does not realize that an injury she has suffered may
be legally cognizable;
(iii) the  consumer’s  claim  is  difficult  and  expensive  to  present,  relative  
to the anticipated recovery;109 or
(iv) the consumer seeks injunctive or other group relief.110
When any or several of these features are present, it becomes difficult
if not impossible for consumers to present their claims individually,
whether through customer service, chargebacks, arbitration, or other
individual means.
Let us consider some examples of PD claims. Daniel Rodriguez
applies for a car loan in Los Angeles. Daniel is offered a loan by the bank,
but the interest rate is higher than the bank offers to similarly situated
Caucasians.111 Discrimination on the basis of race or ethnicity is illegal,
and Daniel could potentially file a lawsuit under the Equal Credit
Opportunity Act.112 However, Daniel has a PD claim. Although he may be
aware of the interest rate he was offered, he may well not know that others
109. See, e.g., Oren Bar-Gill & Elizabeth Warren, Making Credit Safer, 157 U. PA. L. REV. 1,
77 (2008) (observing that the harm caused by consumer credit products is typically a highprobability, low magnitude harm for which individual litigation is not effective, and that
companies use arbitration to elude class actions which otherwise might change their economic
incentives).
110. See Charles S. Mishkind & V. Scott Kneese, The Big Risks: Class Action and Pattern and
Practice Cases, in PRACTICING LAW INSTITUTE, LITIGATION AND ADMINISTRATIVE PRACTICE
COURSE HANDBOOK SERIES, 637 PLI/Lit 339, 398 (2001) (“injunctive relief is an important part
of resolving a class action—often the most important part, as injunctive relief often changes the
way a company does business”).
111. Public Justice, a national public interest law firm specializing in socially significant civil
litigation, has noted that whereas in the early 2000s “several large class actions were settled
against auto finance lenders such as GMAC, Ford Motor Credit, etc., involving shocking
disparities in the finance charges to white and African-American borrowers,” resulting in
injunctive relief that largely eliminated this problem, car dealers have subsequently begun to use
arbitration clauses to shield lenders from such suits. Public Justice Comments to Bureau of
Consumer Financial Protection In Response to Request for Information for Study of Pre-Dispute
Arbitration Agreements 8 (June 23, 2012), available at http://www.regulations.gov/
#!docketDetail;dct=FR%252BPR%252BN%252BO%252BSR;rpp=25;po=0;D=CFPB-20120017. See Ian Ayres, Fair Driving: Gender and Race Discrimination in Retail Car Negotiations,
104 HARV. L. REV. 817, 818-19 (1991) (discussing study showing that car dealers discriminate
with respect to price on the basis of gender and race).
112. 15 U.S.C. § 1691 (2006).
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were offered lower rates nor certainly that rates may depend on race or
ethnicity. Daniel also may not know that the injury he suffered is legally
cognizable. Without knowing about the race and ethnicity of other loan
applicants, and without being aware of details of their loan applications,
Daniel has little or no reason even to suspect discrimination.113 As one
attorney put it, “The  majority  of  [loan  applicants]  are  not  even  aware  that  
they paid or continue to pay extra for their . . .  loans.”114
Even if Daniel suspected discrimination, perhaps because of a
newspaper story, word of mouth, or publicity by a government agency on
the subject, he likely could not effectively bring a claim individually.
While  Daniel’s  damages  may  be  significant,  from  his  personal  standpoint,  
they likely are not sufficient to induce an attorney to take his claim on a
contingent fee basis. Perhaps the loan Daniel got was for $30,000. Had he
gotten a somewhat lower interest rate, how much better off would he have
been than he is now? A few hundred dollars? A few thousand? An
attorney cannot afford to take a case on a contingent fee basis if the
damages are that low, even where attorney fees are available to prevailing
parties, as is the case with ECOA.115 Nor can Daniel likely afford to hire an
attorney by the hour. He probably has no substantial savings he can use for
that purpose. And, without an attorney it will be virtually impossible for

113. Along similar lines, researchers recently found that bankruptcy attorneys were apparently
steering clients towards particular types of bankruptcy based on their race. Tara Siegel Bernard,
Blacks Face Bias in Bankruptcy, Study Suggests, N. Y. TIMES, Jan. 21, 2012, at A.1, available at
http://www.nytimes.com/2012/01/21/business/blacks-face-bias-in-bankruptcy-study-suggests.html
(finding bankruptcy attorneys were far more likely to steer blacks than whites into more expensive
Chapter 13 bankruptcies, even when members of the two races had identical financial situations).
114. Austin Kilgore, Wells Fargo Suit Gets Class Action in Los Angeles, HOUSINGWIRE (Sep.
1, 2009), http://www.housingwire.com/news/wells-fargo-suit-gets-class-action-los-angeles (discussing home loans).
115. Virtually no case is enough of a “sure thing” to warrant taking it on a mere chance of
being reimbursed for one’s time. See Gilles & Friedman, supra note 18, at 21–22 (“The main
problem [with consumers pursuing individual arbitration] will be attracting plaintiffs’ counsel:
rational lawyers will be deterred by prohibitive disincentives. The availability of attorneys’ fees
under fee-shifting statutes is not a realistic inducement in consumer cases.”); Glover, supra note
103, at 1184 (“The fee-shifting mechanism is unlikely to provide sufficient enforcement
incentives for anyone other than individuals possessing high-value claims . . . .”); Statement of
Robert C. Gilbert, supra note 76, at 7 (explaining difficulties of securing counsel to represent
consumers in individual disputes regarding retail banking fees). See Jean R. Sternlight, The
Supreme Court’s Denial of Reasonable Attorneys’ Fees to Prevailing Civil Rights Plaintiffs, 17
N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 535, 537–39 (1989) (discussing how Supreme Court’s attorneys’
fee decisions have “ensured that attorneys receive far less than is necessary to compensate them
reasonably,” and that for that reason “many civil rights plaintiffs with colorable claims cannot find
attorneys willing to represent them.”). For discussion of remedies available in ECOA claims see
Equal Credit Opportunity, FED. TRADE COMM’N, http://www.ftc.gov/bcp/edu/pubs/consumer/
credit/cre15.shtm.
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Daniel to win a claim like this.116 To prevail he would need to conduct
substantial and complicated discovery regarding the loan policies at the
Bank, and how they were applied to a broad range of people. He would
need to send out document requests, deal with objections thereto, and
conduct numerous depositions. He probably would need to retain at least
one expert witness.
The example is not purely hypothetical. One law firm, which
successfully handled class actions of this nature and secured monetary and
nonmonetary relief for the class, stated that:
The [class] litigation [we handled] would not be possible in the wake of
Concepcion. Individual arbitration would not protect consumers in cases
involving discrimination because: (1) consumers are generally unaware
that their rights have been violated; (2) individual litigation is
prohibitively expensive, given the data analysis, depositions, document
review, and sophisticated legal work required to rove a claim; and (3) an
arbitrator would be unlikely (and defendants would argue, unable) to order
117
nationwide injunctive relief in an individual case to stop this practice.

But such discrimination claims are not that exceptional, and instead
merely exemplify PD claims. Other PD claims might include claims that
Facebook   is   misusing   its   customers’   private   information,118 banks are
refusing to refund members of the armed services certain payments to
which they are entitled in the event they have to end a car lease early
because of being called to active duty,119 payday lenders were subjecting
customers to excessive interest fees,120 food a consumer ate was harmful,121
116. While a government agency could potentially help enforce the rights of Daniel or other
wronged consumers, such agencies are not currently sufficiently well-funded to represent all the
Daniels in the United States. See infra Part III.B.1.
117. Letter from David Stellings, supra note 86, at 5.
118. Somini Sengupta, To Settle Lawsuit, Facebook Alters Policy for Its Like Button, N. Y.
TIMES, June 22, 2012, at B2, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2012/06/22/technology/tosettle-suit-facebook-alters-policies-for-like-button.html (discussing settlement of a class action
lawsuit brought against Facebook to change practice whereby Facebook was using customers’
names and photos to advertise products without receiving express permission from those
customers).
119. Matthew Wolf, a captain in the Judge Advocate General Corps of the Army Reserves,
attempted to present such a claim under the Servicemembers Civil Relief Act on behalf of a class
of similarly situated members of the armed services. However, the federal district court
disallowed his class action on the ground it was precluded by an arbitral class action prohibition.
See Wolf v. Nissan Motor Acceptance Corp., No. 10-3338 (NLH/KMW), 2012 WL 1079340
(D.N.J. Mar. 29, 2012). See also Segal, supra note 25 (reporting on Wolf’s situation and the
impact of Concepcion on prospective class actions).
120. See, e.g., Buckeye Check Cashing Inc. v. Cardegna, 546 U.S. 440, 442, 449 (2006)
(finding, in putative class action brought against payday lender on usury grounds, that arbitrator,
not court must determine whether arbitration clause was illegal and therefore void ab initio);
Robinson v. Title Lenders, No. SC 91728, 2012 WL 724669 (Mo. Mar. 6, 2012) (finding in

3.STERNLIGHT.MACRO.10.29.12 (DO NOT DELETE)

2012]

1/24/2013 1:52 PM

MA ND AT OR Y BI N DI NG ARBIT RA TIO N C LA US E S

111

a particular car has a tendency to tip over on tight turns,122 banks were
charging customers excessive overdraft fees,123 a school made fraudulent
promises   as   to   students’   employment   prospects,124 a computer lacks the
promised gigabyte capacity,125 claims that a cell phone provider could not
putative class action brought against payday lender that the arbitration clause was not
unconscionable based on the class waiver).
121. E.g., Levy v. Keystone Food Products, No. 07-5502, 2008 WL 4115856 (E.D. Pa. Aug.
28, 2008) (class action alleging damages due to alleged mislabeling of food as “low-fat” and
containing only 120 calories); Peet v. Sweet Onion, Inc., No. 251736, 2005 WL 624895 (Mich.
App. Mar. 17, 2005) (putative class action claiming damages due to food poisoning at a wedding
anniversary party).
122. E.g., Am. Suzuki Motor Corp. v. Super. Ct., 44 Cal. Rptr. 2d 526, 527 (Dist. Ct. App.
1995) (class action lawsuit against Suzuki due to the alleged tendency of its Samurai SUVs to rollover under ordinary driving conditions); In the Matter of Bridgestone/Firestone, Inc., 288 F.3d
1012 (7th Cir. 2002) (class action brought against Bridgestone/Firestone for highly defective
tires).
123. Statement of Robert C. Gilbert, supra note 76 (discussing handling of Multidistrict
Litigation No. 2036, In Re: Checking Account Overdraft Litigation, in which 70 law firms
successfully represented millions of American banking customers with claims that banks used
improper practices to maximize overdraft fees, and concluding that following Concepcion a
number of banks will be able to continue their improper practice as class actions won’t be possible
and individual claims along these lines are infeasible). The statement explains that individual
arbitrations could not secure relief with respect to the overdraft practices because, inter alia
plaintiffs need to rely on substantial expert testimony and discovery, because many consumer
arbitrations are required to be completed in thirty days without substantial discovery, and because
the costs of these claims would be prohibitive in light of individual prospective gains. Id.
124. Are Law Schools the “Next Tobacco” for Class Action Lawyers?, FORBES (Mar 16,
2012), http://www.forbes.com/sites/wlf/2012/03/16/are-law-schools-the-next-tobacco-for-classaction-lawyers/ (reporting on class action claims brought against law schools that allegedly
published exaggerated employment rates); Terence Chea, Culinary School Grads Claim They
Were Ripped Off, ASSOCIATED PRESS (Sep. 14, 2011), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/
2011/09/06/culinary-school-grads-ripped-off_n_950107.html (discussing class actions suits
brought against Career Education Corp., alleging that some of its for-profit Le Cordon Bleu
culinary schools misrepresented graduates’ earnings potential and job prospects, and noting that
settlement will provide students as much as $20,000 each); Tom McNichol, Learning the Hard
Way: For-profit Colleges Pay Dearly for their Students’ Discontent, CALIFORNIA LAWYER (Oct.
2011), http://www.callawyer.com/clstory.cfm?eid=918229 (discussing class actions filed against
for-profit schools, such as Westwood College’s subsidiary Westwood Apex, for misrepresenting
its true cost of attendance, accreditation, and job placement rates, due to deceptive recruitment
practices); Kilgore v. KeyBank, Nat. Ass’n, 673 F.3d 947 (9th Cir. 2012) (mandating that claims
against private for-profit colleges for engaging in deceptive practices in an effort to attract
students be resolved in individualized arbitration); Bernal v. Burnett, 793 F. Supp. 2d 1280 (D.
Colo. 2011) (same).
125. E.g., Goldberg v. Apple Computer, Inc., No. BC302530, 2004 WL 4979232 (Cal. Super.
Mar. 30, 2004) (discussing class action lawsuit attempted against Apple, Gateway, Dell, and other
major computer manufacturers for misrepresenting the size of their computers’ hard drives);
Safier v. Western Digital Corp., No. 05-03353 BZ, 2006 WL 735056 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 1, 2006)
(class action lawsuit attempted against Western Digital Corporation for misrepresenting the hard
drive sizes of its computers); see also Western Digital Settles Hard-Drive Capacity Lawsuit,
FOXNEWS.COM (June 28, 2006), http://www.foxnews.com/story/0,2933,201269,00.html (describ-
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slow   down   or   eliminate   customers’   access   to   the   “unlimited   data   plan”  
provided for in their contract,126 or claims that a seller failed to disclose
radon on a property.127
With respect to some of these potential claims, the consumer may not
even realize she has been harmed. Consumers who do not peruse their bills
extremely carefully may be subjected to interest charges or other fees that
they may not notice.128 And, it is well known that most of us do not read
the fine print.129 An individual who is exposed to tainted food130 or a toxic
chemical in the home131 or in a product they purchased132 may have no way
ing terms of the settlement in Safier, including giving free software to a million previous
consumers).
126. See JUSTICE DENIED, supra note 6, at 12–14 (discussing class action brought by TMobile customer Trent Alvarez, and explaining that post-Concepcion the court rejected plaintiff’s
attempt to void the arbitral class action waiver contained in the contract).
127. E.g., Casale v. Segal & Morel at Lopatcong, LLC, No. A-1879-10T4, 2011 WL 2306906
(N.J. Super. App. Div. May 12, 2011) (class action claiming sellers and radon mitigation system
installers provided malfunctioning radon mitigation systems that did not pass radon detection
tests); see also State ex rel. Richmond Am. Homes of W. Virginia, Inc. v. Sanders, 717 S.E.2d
909, 913 (Va. 2011) (class action against new-home constructor for injuries from radon gas
leaking into new homes due to alleged poor construction of houses).
128. CompuCredit Corp. v. Greenwood, 132 S. Ct. 665, 668 (2012) (attempting to bring class
action against credit card company which allegedly assessed fees of which consumers were
unaware, thereby impairing consumers’ credit ratings).
129. E.g., Shmuel I. Becher, Asymmetric Information in Consumer Contracts: The Challenge
that is Yet to be Met, 45 AM. BUS. L.J. 723, 730-31 (2008) (empirical evidence shows that most
consumers do not read [standard form contracts]); Amy J. Schmitz, Consideration of
“Contracting Culture” in Enforcing Arbitration Provisions, 81 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 123, 160
(2007) (“consumers rarely read or understand” arbitration agreements); Yannis Bakos, Florencia
Marotta-Wurgler and David R. Trossen, Does Anyone Read the Fine Print? Testing a Law and
Economics Approach to Standard Form Contracts (N.Y.U. Law & Econ. Research Paper Series,
Working Paper No. 09-40, 2009), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1443256 (concluding that
just one or two among a thousand online shoppers reviewed terms provided by online merchants).
See also Russell Korobkin, Bounded Rationality, Standard Form Contracts, and
Unconscionability, 70 U. CHI. L. REV. 1203, 1217 (2003).
130. E.g., In re Pet Food Prods. Liab. Litig., 629 F.3d 333 (3d Cir. 2010) (class action brought
with regard to contaminated pet food).
131. Smith v. Behr Process Corp., 54 P.3d 665 (Wash. Ct. App. 2002) (alleging through class
action that household products intended for use on exterior wood surfaces caused mildew damage
in homes); German v. Fed. Home Loan Mortg. Corp., No. 93 Civ. 6941 (MBM), 1998 WL
812478, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 16, 1998) (bringing class action against manufacturers of hazardous
lead paint and owners and managers of apartment buildings who allegedly knew the paint had
been used in the buildings but did not warn tenants).
132. E.g., Ford v. Toys R Us, Inc., No. W2005-01117-COA-R3-CV, 2006 WL 561865 (Tenn.
Ct. App. Mar. 9, 2006) (bringing class action against Toys R Us, Inc. for allegedly selling
children’s necklaces made entirely from lead); Jones v. Allercare, Inc., 203 F.R.D. 290 (N.D. Ohio
2001) (bringing class action lawsuit against producer of household products alleging that
ingredients caused adverse medical reactions amongst consumers); Harding v. Tambrands Inc.,
165 F.R.D. 623 (D. Kan. 1996) (attempting class action lawsuit against manufacturers of tampons
for allegedly causing toxic shock syndrome in consumers).
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of knowing their health has been endangered. Nor will it immediately be
evident that a computer lacks the promised capacity.133
Further, even consumers who know they have been billed or otherwise
harmed will often not know that inflicting the harm is illegal. Financial
institutions may impose interest and late fees. Which such charges are
impermissible?134 Some cars are just more prone to tip than others, all
brakes and tires inevitably give out, and everyone knows not all medical
expenses are reimbursable. Which of these problems is likely to lead to a
victory in court for the consumer?
Some may contend that if a consumer does not realize he has been
harmed then surely he has not been harmed in any significant way. Yet, the
examples above and many others defeat this contention. Why should we
protect only those consumers who realize they have been harmed? A
consumer who has been defrauded or poisoned or victimized by
discrimination has been harmed, whether or not they are cognizant of that
harm.
Consumers’   claims   may   also   be   procedurally   difficult,   even   when  
consumers know or reasonably believed they have been wronged by illegal
conduct, if it is not feasible for them to bring a claim in any forum. That is,
the costs of complaining about a supposed problem may exceed the likely
benefits of making the complaint. This problem, of costs exceeding likely
gains, is well recognized in the litigation context.135 “Negative  value”  suits  
are those in which the likely cost of pursuing relief exceeds the likely
payoff.136 As Justice Breyer noted, dissenting in Concepcion,  “The  realistic  

133. See Goldberg, 2004 WL 4979232; Safier, 2006 WL 735056; Western Digital Settles
Hard-Drive Capacity Lawsuit, supra note 125.
134. The author, for example, has a bill from her cable provider showing fees for “FCC access
charge,” “FCC Fee,” “franchise fee,” “Federal Excise Tax,” “Local Telecommunications Tax,”
“Telecommunications Relay,” “Federal USF,” “Carrier Cost Recovery Fee,” “State Universal
Service Fund Fee,” and “Federal Universal Service Fund.” These mysterious fees total almost
$15 per month, and thus almost $200 per year.
135. See John C. Coffee, Jr., Litigation Governance: Taking Accountability Seriously, 110
COLUM. L. REV. 288, 293 (2010) (“Both sides recognize that entrepreneurial litigation enables
negative value claims to be litigated . . . .”).
136. See Lucian A. Bebchuk & Alon Klement, Negative-Expected-Value Suits, in
PROCEDURAL LAW AND ECONOMICS (Chris Sanchirico ed., 2011), available at http://ssrn.com/
abstract=1534703; see also Coffee, Litigation Governance, supra note 135, at 292 (“‘[N]egative
value’ claims—that is, those claims that, while meritorious, have an enforcement cost in excess of
their individual value.”); Amchem Prods. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591, 617 (1997) (“The policy at
the very core of the class action mechanism is to overcome the problem that small recoveries do
not provide the incentive for any individual to bring a solo action prosecuting his or her rights.”
(quoting Mace v. Van Ru Credit Corp., 109 F.3d 338, 344 (7th Cir. 1997)).
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alternative to a class action is not 17 million individual suits, but zero
individual  suits,  as  only  a  lunatic  or  a  fanatic  sues  for  $30.”137
Yet, the problem   of   “negative   value”   can   arise   not   only   in   litigation,  
but in other forums as well. While the high cost of discovery and the
formality of litigation obviously create the possibility that the cost of
pursuing a remedy will exceed the likely payoff, this relationship is possible
as well when pursuing a claim in arbitration or even just with customer
service.138 Similarly, although the cost of pursuing a claim in arbitration or
with customer service may be less than the cost of pursuing that claim in
litigation, the cost of pursuing a claim is never zero.139 Even in the rare
case where the monetary costs were zero, because there was no filing fee
and the consumer could file without leaving her home or retaining
representation, the consumer would still want to take account of nonmonetary costs such as lost time or frustration.
Further, some small claims, by their nature, are complex and difficult
to prove. Unlike the PE claims described above, where the consumer can
essentially tell her story and hope to prevail, PD claims will often require a
claimant or her representative to amass, understand and organize
complicated facts; to conduct legal research; to offer expert testimony; or to
write complex legal arguments.
That is, except in very unusual
circumstances it is highly unlikely that a consumer could present a PD
claim on her own, unrepresented by an attorney.140 Consider how a
consumer might go about trying to prove that he was charged excessive
interest by a payday lender, or that a check-bouncing fee was too high.
Unless the consumer happened to have a background in accounting or law,
the task seems impossible, and even with that background the consumer

137. AT&T Mobility v. Concepcion, 563 U.S. 1740, 1761 (2011) (Breyer, J., dissenting)
(quoting Carnegie v. Household Int’l Inc., 376 F.3d 656, 661 (7th Cir. 2004) (Posner, J.).
138. Schmitz, Access to Consumer Remedies, supra note 95, at 294-95. (arguing that
companies make it difficult to pursue claims so that the time and expense needed to battle with
customer services representatives is not worthwhile).
139. Even those consumers who initially file claims may well give up at some point along the
way, as they run out of time and resources. Schmitz, Access to Consumer Remedies, supra note
95, at 309 nn.237–38; See also Marco B.M. Loos, Individual Private Enforcement of Consumer
Rights in Civil Courts in Europe (Ctr. For the Study of Eur. Contract Law Working Paper Series,
Paper No. 2010/01), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1535819 (finding that almost half of
consumers who filed an initial complaint gave up on the claim without reaching an agreement or
resolution).
140. See Jean R. Sternlight, Lawyerless Dispute Resolution: Rethinking a Paradigm, 37
FORDHAM URB. L.J. 381 (2010) (arguing that individuals may have as great a need for
representation in ADR processes as they do in litigation).
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might not be able to meet the challenge.141 Or, consider a consumer who
was disappointed by her new phone’s   tendency   to   lose   reception.142 The
monetary damages are small, but proving that the phone is dropping too
many calls will likely require technical expertise and perseverance. Is the
problem   really   the   phone?      The   customer’s   location?      Something   the
customer is doing when she speaks on the phone?
Moreover, even larger claims can be too costly to bring in informal
settings as well as in litigation. To prevail in a loan discrimination claim a
consumer would have to not only show that she met the relevant test for
obtaining a loan at a particular rate, but also that she had presented those
facts to the lender, and that the lender when faced with similar applications
from members of other ethnic or racial groups handled the applications
differently.143 To prevail in a claim alleging that food, a home or a product
was somehow contaminated the consumer would need to prove the
contamination, prove that the contamination was medically harmful, and
prove that the defendant was aware of the contamination and failed to take
adequate steps to prevent that harm.144 Whether the consumer asserts such
claims to customer service, on-line, or in arbitration she will need to gather
substantial legal and factual evidence and will likely need to present expert
opinion. It is virtually impossible to imagine a consumer presenting such a
claim on her own, without legal representation.
Finally, claims that seek injunctive relief, rather than individual
compensation or damages, are often procedurally difficult. When a
consumer merely asks to receive a refund or an alternative product or
service a dispute is far simpler than when the consumer seeks to change a
company’s   rules   and   procedures.      Consumers   who   seek   such   injunctive  
relief must typically prove more and often must also deal with greater
141. Statement Robert C. Gilbert, supra note 76, at 6 (observing that plaintiffs in class action
bank overdraft cases “have only been able to determine which overdrafts were wrongful by having
an expert examine the banks’ computer data and run an algorithm that deconstructs precisely
which transactions caused which overdraft fees”).
142. See Charlie Sorrel, iPhone 4 Loses Reception When Antenna Band Is Touched, WIRED
(June 24, 2010, 8:30 AM), http://www.wired.com/gadgetlab/2010/06/iphone-4-loses-receptionwhen-antenna-band-is-touched-firmware-issue/; Jason O. Gilbert, Users’ 8 Biggest Problems With
Apple’s iPhone 4S, HUFFINGTON POST (Oct. 17, 2011, 5:42 PM), available at http://www.
huffingtonpost.com/2011/10/17/iphone-4s-problems-issues-complaints_n_1015538.html.
143. See James Sacher, Housing Discrimination Litigation, 28 AM. JUR. TRIALS 1 (1981).
144. Jonathan Harr’s book, A CIVIL ACTION, describes litigation involving a claim that two
companies’ chemical disposal policies polluted the water of Woburn MA and caused residents to
get cancer. JONATHAN HARR, A CIVIL ACTION 6, 295, 456 (Vintage Books, 1996). This
litigation lasted more than eight years and bankrupted plaintiffs’ attorneys. See Jerome P. Facher,
The View from the Bottomless Pit: Truth, Myth, and Irony in A Civil Action, 23 SEATTLE U. L.
REV. 243, 243 (1999) (defense attorney Jerry Facher,was involved in the litigation for over 8
years).
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resistance from the company. While a company may be willing to relieve
one consumer of a particular charge, it would be far more costly to take this
action as to all consumers.
2. Can Procedurally Difficult Claims be Brought Individually in
Arbitration?
The question at the heart of this Article is whether it is feasible to
devise an individualized dispute resolution process that could effectively
handle procedurally difficult claims. Can we, for example, design flexible,
cheap, accessible on-line processes and use these to resolve claims that
would otherwise be procedurally difficult? Would that it were so!
Unfortunately, however, for the most part it does not seem feasible to
use inexpensive accessible individualized processes to resolve procedurally
difficult claims. While inexpensive accessible processes are desirable, they
do not solve the problems linked to procedurally difficult claims. Consider
each of the elements of PD claims, and you will see that they are not easily
solved by inexpensive accessible individualized processes.
First, consider the consumer who does not realize she has been harmed,
or who does not realize she has been harmed in an impermissible way. As
the consumer does not realize she has been harmed, or harmed illegally, she
will not file a claim, no matter how easy it might be to file a claim. In other
words, making a dispute resolution procedure cheaper or more accessible
does not solve the problem of consumers who do not know they were
harmed, or do not realize that the harm was illegal.
Are there ways to improve individualized arbitration as a tool to bring
procedurally difficult claims? Can we use the Internet or other measures to
overcome some or all of the challenges of procedurally difficult claims?
Can we provide attorneys with fees or other incentives to support bringing
such claims? At first glance, this all sounds promising, and to a limited
extent this likely can work. Attorney Heather Peters gained a lot of national
attention when she opted out of a class action settlement and brought and
won almost $10,000 in a lawsuit on her own behalf in small claims court
against Honda, alleging that her hybrid car did not provide the fifty miles
per gallon that was promised.145 Some commentators stated, at the time of
her victory, that it might spark a new means of litigating consumer claims
other than through class actions.146 Indeed, a number of other consumers
145. See Jerry Hirsch, Honda Loses Small Claims Court Suit Over Civic Hybrid Fuel
Economy, L.A. TIMES (Feb. 2, 2012), available at http://articles.latimes.com/2012/feb/02/
business/la-fi-autos-honda-lawsuit-20120202.
146. Id. Indeed Ms. Peters had opted out of a class action settlement that would have brought
her a few hundred dollars and coupons she could use towards buying another Honda. She urged
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followed  Ms.  Peters’  example  and  filed  their  own  small  claims  suits  against  
Honda.147
Yet, while this approach might succeed in a few instances, for the most
part it seems implausible. In the end, Ms. Peters lost her case on appeal and
was required to pay Honda $75 in court costs.148 More generally, one
problem with using the Internet to replace class actions is that before
sending out a notice to all consumers that they may have been wronged by
an improper charge, an inflated price, a defective product, or a
contaminated food, someone would have to figure out that a wrong had
been committed. But who would that someone be? If an individual
consumer, how would they figure it out? And, would their posts to the
Internet be seen and credited or instead ignored by other consumers?
Maria Glover puts the issue well:
[W]ithin the area of consumer welfare, where harm is frequently hidden
and widely dispersed, the availability of arbitration pursuant to such feeshifting clauses is insufficient to bring about private enforcement of
wrongdoing. Rather, the ferreting out of misconduct like consumer fraud
requires expertise frequently not in the hands of consumers; they are thus
unlikely, on their own, to possess or process relevant information in such a
way that would motivate them to arbitrate. Moreover, it is inconceivable
that a private attorney, who might be sufficiently expert in consumer
fraud, would have the economic incentive to root out consumer fraud if
the only economic gain is to be had through individual arbitrations; the
significant investment of resources required to identify wronged
individuals and to pursue their small claims one-by-one likely would not
149
justify any eventual gains.

Perhaps individual attorneys could make posts on the Internet
regarding problems they had identified, and then ask consumers who felt
they had been aggrieved to call the attorney’s   office   and   become   a   client.    
Under one variant of this idea, the attorneys might even buy potential legal
claims from consumers, although the law regarding sale of claims is quite

other consumers to opt out of the settlement as well. See also Jerry Hirsch, Honda Wins Reversal
of Civic Hybrid Small-Claims Judgment, L.A. TIMES (May 9, 2012), available at
http://www.latimes.com/business/money/la-fi-mo-honda-civic-lawsuit-20120509,0,3088344.story.
147. Honda Wins Reversal of Civic Hybrid Small-Claims Judgment, HUFFINGTON POST (Apr.
20, 2012, 6:07 PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2012/04/20/honda-hybrid-lawsuit_n_
1441913.html (stating that out of 200,000 class action members, 1,700 were spurred by Ms. Peters
to opt out of the settlement as of April 2012, presumably to bring claims on their own).
148. Hirsch, supra note 145 (Honda reported it won all but one of the other eighteen lawsuits
brought against it on these grounds as well).
149. Glover, supra note 103, at 1210.
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disparate.150 We already have this system partially in place.151 Attorneys
do advertise potential problems with particular drugs, for example, and ask
people to call in if they feel they have been adversely affected by that
drug.152 For those consumers who may at least suspect they have a claim,
attorneys also have also created web sites to provide more information and
attract the consumer as a client.153 Could this same system be used to help
consumers aggrieved by excessive interest fees or anti-competitive
behavior?
Certainly attorneys already do make use of the Internet to identify
potential clients. Surely this can be effective in some cases, for example
when  consumers’  claims  are  large  enough  and  easy  to  identify.    However,  it  
does not seem likely that they can use this approach to replace class actions.
First, while attorneys may advertise potential wrongs it is quite unclear how
many consumers will see those ads, know that the ads apply to them, or
choose to respond. Consumers may be quite aware that they own a
particular Honda hybrid, but they are far less likely to be aware that they are
subjected to particular small but incorrect charges on their cell phone bill.
Second, we all suffer from information overload as it is. How many of us
have ever even looked at the websites that already list ongoing class actions
from which one might seek relief,154 much less taken any steps to benefit
from such a website?
Apart from the limited extent to which the Internet can be used to
inform consumers of possible claims, it also seems unlikely that the Internet
can help many consumers win their claims. Bringing a claim is one thing,
and winning that claim yet another. Even if a consumer learned, through
150. For discussion of the state of the law regarding the permissibility of selling legal claims
see Michael Abramowicz, On the Alienability of Legal Claims, 114 YALE L.J. 697 (2005).
151. Id. at 699-700 (discussing the states’ different approaches to barring and permitting
alienation).
152. See BowersoxLawFirm, PRADAXA Injury Lawyer–Small injuries could equal death,
YOUTUBE (Mar. 21, 2012), http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=R37zL-qekeQ (ad regarding
alleged negative effects of blood-thinning medication Pradaxa); Goodlegaladvicenow,
Antidepressants Effexor, Paxil, Zoloft and Wellbutrin Linked To Birth Defects, YOUTUBE (Mar.
24, 2011), http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=SQvMqMQkpec. (ad regarding anti-depressants
potentially causing birth defects); MSInternetConsulting, Yaz Side Effects Lawsuit, YOUTUBE
(Sept. 17, 2009), http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Q73-6mMQ9a0 (ad regarding alleged
negative effects of Yaz birth control pills).
153. See Seroquel Lawyers, VILES & BECKMAN, http://www.vilesandbeckman.com/
seroquel.asp (attorney website regarding potential for filing claims due to taking antipsychotic
medication Seroquel) and Yasmin & Yaz Lawyers: Yasmin Lawsuits, FORTHEPEOPLE.COM,
http://www.forthepeople.com/yasmin-and-yaz-lawyers-yasmin-lawsuits—11-2508.html (attorney
website regarding potential for filing claims due to taking Yaz and Yasmin birth control pills).
154. E.g., CLASS ACTION WORLD, http://classactionworld.com/; TOP CLASS ACTIONS,
http://www.topclassactions.com/.
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the Internet, that she possibly had a viable claim that she was a victim of
discrimination, excessive check bouncing fees, or that the pet food she had
purchased was contaminated, she would have to present sufficient law and
facts to prevail on that claim. As Ms. Peters (herself an attorney)
discovered when she brought her claim against Honda in small claims
court, winning large claims against a company is not easy in any setting.
Without the assistance of an attorney it would be particularly difficult or
impossible for a consumer to prevail on many claims, though she might of
course recover on a very simple claim such as a mistaken charge on her cell
phone bill. Internet or not, if a consumer wants to bring a claim involving
complex facts or law, or which requires gathering of data on other
consumers’   experiences,   it   seems   that   someone   must   devote   substantial  
resources to the claim. Whether that someone be a government agency, a
plaintiffs’  class  action  firm,  or  a  State  AG,  it  does  not  seem  that  individual  
consumers will be up to the job of proving claims of discrimination, tainted
products, or complex financial charges.
IV. THE PRESENTATION OF PROCEDURALLY DIFFICULT CLAIMS
A. Class Actions as a Device to Present Procedurally Difficult Claims
While class actions may potentially be faulted on other grounds, the
class action device seems perfectly devised to help resolve procedurally
difficult consumer claims. First, class actions can solve the problem of
consumers not knowing they were harmed, or not knowing they were
harmed in an illegal way.155 Class actions are representative claims.156
Under the version of class actions covered by Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 23, named plaintiffs can represent other similarly situated
persons who do not know they have been harmed, and who do not even
know, at least initially, that a class action has been filed on their behalf. 157
Absent class members  generally  need  not  “opt  in”  to  the  class,  and  instead  
can recover as part of the class without needing to take any action

155. Coffee, supra note 135 (discussing the representative nature of class actions in the United
States and the advantages and disadvantages to the class with the opt-out model).
156. Id. The opt-out model for class actions used in the United States allows consumers who
do not know they were harmed to learn of the harm and receive the benefits of the action without
needing to take an affirmative action. Id.
157. Fed. R. Civ. P. Rule 23 permits a class to be certified so long as it meets the Rule 23(a)
requirements of numerosity, typicality, commonality, and adequacy of representation, and so long
as it falls into one of the Rule 23(b) categories. See Walmart v. Dukes, 131 S. Ct. 2541, 2548
(2011).
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whatsoever.158 Thus, a class action could be filed on behalf of persons who
had been harmed by discriminatory lending or charged excessive fees or
exposed to harmful chemicals even if the vast number of the members of
the class had no idea they had been harmed, or harmed illegally. Only the
named plaintiff and the attorney for the named plaintiff would necessarily
have to be aware of the fact that the class members were allegedly harmed,
or harmed in violation of the law.159
Second, class actions also offer a solution to the problem of claims that
are too difficult or expensive to present, given their likely payout. In
litigation as in life, there is often strength in numbers. When numerous
persons join together in a class their prospective joint gains, even if quite
small individually, are sufficient to permit attorneys to handle the case on a
contingent fee basis.160 The joint litigation also allows attorneys to provide
the resources necessary to hire experts, do substantial discovery and legal
research, and present a complex case.
Finally, class actions provide a vehicle whereby groups of consumers
can assert claims for injunctive relief, as well as for damages. Whereas an
individual consumer could, at most, expect to obtain a refund or a new
product, a group of consumers suing as a class can and often does demand
that a manufacturer or service provider change its practices.161
B. Are Class Actions the Only Means of Presenting Procedurally Difficult
Claims?
Few people, and certainly not this author, would claim that class
actions are a perfect procedural device. Even groups that are great fans of
the benefits of class actions may recognize that at times they are flawed.162

158. Coffee, supra note 135 (discussing the U.S.’s preferred and only method of opting out, in
contrast to Europe’s opting in method).
159. With the U.S.’s method of opting out, not all members of the class need to know that they
were harmed to be included in the class action. Id. at 296-97.
160. See Jeffrey I. Shinder, In Praise of Class Actions, NAT’L L.J. 39 (2010) (discussing how
class actions can allow “little guy” consumers to join together to bring claims against credit card
merchants).
161. See Levy v. Keystone Food Products, No. 07-5502, 2008 WL 4115856 (E.D. Pa. Aug.
28, 2008) (class action attempting to change the labels on food deemed “low-fat”). See also
sources cited supra note 124 (class actions attempting to transform how for-profit schools
represent employment prospects for students); sources cited supra note 125 (class actions
attempting to alter the way computer manufacturers advertise the size of computer hard drives);
CompuCredit Corp. v. Greenwood, 132 S. Ct. 665, 668 (2012) (class action attempting to modify
credit card company’s method of assessing fees).
162. For example, the organization Public Justice, which describes itself as America’s public
interest law firm, fights both to preserve class actions and also to curb their abuse. See Class
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First, class actions can fairly be criticized for potentially allowing unethical
class counsel to enter into settlements that provide greater benefit to
plaintiffs’   counsel  or  named   plaintiffs  than   to   absent  class   members.163 If
not properly supervised, class actions create this possibility for exploitation
because by definition absent class members are not actively involved in the
lawsuit and thus cannot necessarily adequately protect their own
interests.164
Second, some also criticize class actions for supposedly providing too
much leverage to the plaintiffs, and putting defendants in class actions
under substantial pressure to settle even claims in which they would likely
prevail. Critics espousing this position argue that class actions are simply
so burdensome and expensive that they create a great incentive to settle,
regardless of the merits.165 The Supreme Court majority in AT&T Mobility
v. Concepcion seemed quite sympathetic to this argument.166
From   the   author’s   perspective, these critiques are overblown. While
class actions may at times have their flaws, what in this life is perfect? If
flaws exist let us work to reform rather than entirely eliminate class actions.
Still, it is at least worth exploring what alternative procedural tools might be
useful for helping consumers bring procedurally difficult claims. We will
first briefly examine government enforcement and then examine some
additional more creative alternatives.
1. Government Enforcement as a Means to Assert Procedurally
Difficult Claims
Government agencies are in many ways well suited to protect
consumers who cannot easily protect themselves. Such agencies will, at
least potentially, have the resources to identify harms that may not be
apparent to individual consumers. Whereas an individual consumer may

Action Preservation, PUBLIC JUSTICE, http://www.publicjustice.net/Key-Issues-Cases/Access-ToJustice/Class-Action-Preservation.aspx.
163. For literature discussing this problem see Geoffrey P. Miller, Conflicts of Interest in
Class Action Litigation: An Inquiry into the Appropriate Standard, 2003 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 581
(2003); Sylvia R. Lazos, Note, Abuse in Plaintiff Class Action Settlements: The Need for a
Guardian During Pretrial Settlement Negotiations, 84 MICH. L. REV. 308 (1984).
164. Of course, Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(e) and its state rule equivalents are designed to require
courts to notify all class members of prospective settlements and to require judges to approve only
those settlements that are “fair, reasonable and adequate.”
165. Brief of the Chamber of Commerce of the United States of America as Amicus Curiae in
Support of Petitioner, AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740 (2011) (No. 09-893),
2010 WL 3167313, at *7; see also In the Matter of Rhone-Poulenc Rorer, Inc., 51 F.3d 1293,
1298 (7th Cir. 1995).
166. AT&T Mobility v. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740, 1752 (2011).
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not realize he has been victimized by loan discrimination, a government
agency may gather statistics showing that an inordinate proportion of the
persons denied loans or charged a high rate are racial or ethnic minorities.167
Similarly, although individual consumers do not have the resources to test
their foods or toys for toxic contents government agencies can possibly
perform these tests.168 Thus, government agencies can both help consumers
who do not know they have been harmed, and also help consumers who do
not know they have been harmed in an illegal fashion.
Government agencies can also protect consumers in situations where
extensive resources are needed to present and prove a claim. They can hire
experts, gather data, analyze statistics, and so on. Thus, agencies such as
the Department of Housing and Urban Development,169 the Federal Trade
Commission,170 or the newly created Consumer Financial Protection
Bureau,171 can potentially protect consumers who are unable to protect
themselves.172
167. People who believe they have been victimized by housing discrimination can file an online complaint with the Department of Housing and Urban Development. Housing Discrimination,
HUD.GOV, http://portal.hud.gov/hudportal/HUD?src=/topics/housing_discrimination. Those who
believe they have been victimized by FHA discrimination could file a claim with the Office of
Fair Housing and Equal Opportunity. Fair Housing–It’s Your Right, HUD.GOV, http://portal.hud.
gov/hudportal/HUD?src=/program_offices/fair_housing_equal_opp/FHLaws/yourrights.
For
ECOA discriminatory claims, one files with the Federal Trade Commission. Equal Credit
Opportunity, FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION, http://www.ftc.gov/bcp/edu/pubs/consumer/
credit/cre15.shtm.
168. The Agency for Toxic Substances and Disease Registry “serves the public by using the
best science, taking responsive public health actions, and providing trusted health information to
prevent harmful exposures and diseases related to toxic substances.” Agency for Toxic Substances
and Disease Registry, ATSDR, http://www.atsdr.cdc.gov/. Also, the Environmental Protection
Agency does testing on things such as radon, water pollution, bed bugs, mold, and lead. See U.S.
ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY, http://www.epa.gov/.
169. See Mission, HUD.GOV, http://portal.hud.gov/hudportal/HUD. HUD aims to ensure
everyone has access to robust communities and worthwhile, affordable houses. It does so by
solidifying “the housing market,” filling the demand for “quality affordable rental homes,” using
housing as a way of “improving quality of life,” building “inclusive and sustainable communities
free from discrimination,” and changing “the way the HUD does business.” Id.
170. See About the Federal Trade Commission, FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION,
http://www.ftc.gov/ftc/about.shtm. The FTC works to avert monopolistic, deceptive, and/or unfair
business practices, as well as help consumers and the public at large be more informed. It strives
to achieve these goals without excessive inconveniences on commerce.
171. See Learn about the Bureau, CFPB, http://www.consumerfinance.gov/the-bureau/. The
CFPB focuses on mortgage applications, credit cards, and other financial products for consumers.
It provides consumers with information regarding those areas, supervises financial companies
(including banks and credit unions), enforces federal consumer finance laws, and obtains and
analyzes information regarding consumers, financial service providers, and consumer financial
markets.
172. For an A to Z list of United States agencies geared to protect consumers, see Consumer
Guides and Protection, USA.GOV, http://www.usa.gov/Citizen/Topics/Consumer-Safety.shtml.
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While it is clear that government agencies are potentially well able to
protect consumers who assert procedurally difficult claims, it is far less
clear that United States government agencies will be provided with the
funding necessary to permit them to effectively play this role in the
foreseeable future. As numerous commentators and scholars have
observed, whereas European countries have chosen to use a bureaucratic
model of consumer protection,173 the United States, at least until recently,
had elected to empower consumers to protect themselves.174 Even if, in
theory, government agencies could do a great job of protecting consumers,
poorly funded government agencies cannot.175
2. State AG Actions as a Means to Bring Procedurally Difficult
Claims
If government agencies are poorly funded and class actions are
eliminated, is all hope lost for enforcing consumer claims? We should, at
least, consider a few more possibilities. Myriam Gilles and Gary Friedman
have recently suggested that parens patriae actions brought by state
attorneys general (“AGs”) could potentially fill part of the void left by class
actions.176 They urge that the state AGs could join together with former
plaintiffs’   class   action   attorneys   who,   working   on   a   contingent   fee   basis,  
could   bring   lawsuits   on   behalf   of   the   AG’s   office   for   the   benefit   of   the  
citizenry.177 In theory   at   least   the   idea   is   brilliant.      The   AG’s   office   and  
plaintiffs’   class   action   attorneys,   working   together,   certainly   would   be  
capable of both identifying and also bringing procedurally difficult claims.

173. For comparison of United States and European approaches to consumer protection see
FABRIZIO CAFAGGI & HANS-W. MICKLITZ, EDS., NEW FRONTIERS OF CONSUMER PROTECTION:
THE INTERPLAY BETWEEN PRIVATE AND PUBLIC ENFORCEMENT (2009).
174. See, e.g., SEAN FARHANG, THE LITIGATION STATE (2010) (arguing that the United States
moved sharply to rely on private rather than governmental enforcement beginning in the 1960s,
and attributing this shift substantially to “legislative-executive ideological polarization.” See also
ROBERT A. KAGAN, ADVERSARIAL LEGALISM: THE AMERICAN WAY OF LAW 9 (2001)
(observing that “American way” of law enforcement emphasizes actions by individual litigants).
175. See Glover, supra note 103, at 1150, 1153 (noting that Congressional limitation of
funding for the Department of Labor negatively impacted the Department’s enforcement of the
Fair Labor Standards Act and that government agencies in general have limited resources which
are often not sufficient to perform enforcement tasks); Deborah R. Hensler & Thomas D. Rowe,
Jr., Beyond “It Just Ain’t Worth It”:  Alternative Strategies for Damage Class Action Reform, 64
LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 137, 137 (2001) (noting importance of private enforcement to
supplement public agencies that may be underfunded, or also subject to regulatory capture).
176. Gilles & Friedman, supra note 18, at 660.
177. Id. at 670, 673.
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Further, companies likely could use neither arbitral class action exclusions
nor restrictions on class actions to limit state  AGs’  actions.178
Yet, while I hope state  AGs  take  Gilles  and  Friedman’s  suggestion  and  
begin to bring these claims, I am not holding my breath. The companies
that do not appreciate being regulated by government or sued in class
actions also will not appreciate being sued by state attorneys general. These
companies will likely work hard to defeat the election of any state attorney
general who would boldly apply the Gilles/Friedman idea. The Citizens
United179 decision, having defeated many limits on election spending, will
give companies great power to defeat state AGs of whom they do not
approve.
3. Social Media Assisted Endeavors as a Means to Bring
Procedurally Difficult Claims
Some have suggested that social media and the internet might be used
to help multiple consumers bring claims against companies without resort
to class actions. Indeed quite recently, in direct response to the Supreme
Court’s   decision   in   Concepcion,180 several consumer advocates formed an
organization, Consumers Count, designed to do just this.181 The website
and Facebook page for Consumers Count invite consumers to complain
about unfair company practices.182 The   site   states   that   once   a   “critical  
mass”  of  consumers have complained about the same practice, Consumers
Count  will  “spring  into  action”  and  refer  the  complaints  to  a  law  firm  which  
can then enter into fee agreements with the multiple consumers and attempt
to pursue their claims whether in court, in arbitration, through referral to a
government agency, or in the press.183
The idea of programs such as Consumers Count is intriguing.
Certainly the Internet and social media can be useful to join together people
with common problems. If law firms can then contact many people with
common problems they can potentially represent them, albeit individually,

178. Id. at 668.
179. Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm’n., 130 S. Ct. 876, 886, 917 (2010).
180. AT&T Mobility v. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740, 1753 (2011).
181. See Consumers Count, www.consumerscount.org (last visited Oct. 12, 2012).
182. Id.; Consumers Count, FACEBOOK, www.facebook.com (last visited Oct. 12, 2012).
183. Consumers Count, www.consumerscount.org (last visited Oct. 12, 2012). The website is
also clear that part of the purpose of the organization is to teach consumers and others about the
negative aspects of mandatory arbitration. As one founder puts it in his blog, “Consumers Count
is dedicated to creating a consumer movement to end arbitration in consumer contracts.” Id.
Indeed, an amusing video on the website explains the impact of the Concepcion case on
consumers’ ability to protect themselves from corporate misdeeds. Id.
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in a relatively efficient manner. They can potentially use knowledge or
expertise gained in one claim to help other claimants.
In one way the idea of consumers joining together to file individual
claims may even be highly intimidating to companies. When consumers
file small claims, companies’  own  clauses  or  arbitration  provider  rules  often  
require the company rather than the consumer to pay the bulk of
administration costs and arbitrator fees.184 Although these fees and costs
may be low per individual claim, they can become quite high when many
claims are brought. If the arbitration filing fees and costs were just $1000
(a quite low estimate) and ten thousand consumers were to file individual
claims against the company, the company would have to pay ten million
dollars in filing fees and administrative costs alone.185
Yet, while social media and the Internet may at times help consumers
bring mass claims, this approach   cannot   adequately   replace   class   actions’  
success with procedurally difficult claims. First, consumers who do not
know they have been harmed cannot file claims on social media sites.
Thus, victims of hidden charges, discrimination, contaminated food or
antitrust violations exemplify consumers who will not be aware they ought
to file a claim. While one might suggest that the internet or social media
could be used to educate consumers that they have been harmed, it simply
is not feasible to inform consumers of all of the ways they may have been
harmed.    No  one  has  time  to  investigate  all  the  possible  harms  in  one’s  life,  
even by visiting websites or Facebook pages. Second, even to the extent
consumers become aware of possible harms they will often lack time,
energy or initiative to pursue those claims, even through a social media site.
Third, even to the extent consumers become aware of claims and choose to
file those claims the logistics and economics for law firms to pursue these
claims will be quite difficult. Even entering into fee agreements with
thousands of clients is daunting, not to mention fielding all of their
questions, filing their claims, proceeding with discovery, and trying to
184. For example, the American Arbitration Association procedures for resolving consumerrelated disputes require that for claims under $10,000 the consumer pays only $125 and the
company pays the remaining fees and costs. Consumer, AMERICAN ARBITRATION ASSOCIATION,
http://www.adr.org/aaa/faces/aoe/gc/consumer (last visited Oct. 12, 2012).
185. See supra note 27 and accompanying text for a discussion of this “Sorcerer’s Apprentice”
scenario. Perhaps for this reason financial services attorneys Alan Kaplinsky and Mark Levin
have expressed outrage at the formation of the new organization Consumers Count. Alan S.
Kaplinsky and Mark J. Levin, Consumer Advocates Form “Anti-Arbitration” Organization,
BALLARD SPAHR, LLP, available at http://www.ballardspahr.com/alertspublications/legalalerts/
2012-10-09-consumer-advocates-form-anti-arbitration-organization.aspx (last visited Oct. 13,
2012) (“The attempted use of mass arbitration to destroy consumer arbitration does a great
disservice to consumers who stand to benefit from the efficiencies and economies inherent in the
arbitral process.”).
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negotiate settlements or present those claims. One can be fairly sure that
companies will resist plaintiffs’   attempts   to   use   expert   evidence   and  
testimony in multiple disputes. Thus, it is likely that many or most
procedurally difficult claims will remain difficult, even when tackled with
the Internet and social media.
V. CONCLUSIONS
In sum, by allowing companies to prevent consumers from suing them
in   class   actions   the   Supreme   Court’s   decision   in   AT&T Mobility v.
Concepcion186 prevents consumers from bringing procedurally difficult
claims. Claims in which consumers previously succeeded, in class actions,
are now failing due to class action prohibitions.187 Thus, it is now clear that
arbitration clauses have defeated class actions,188 and that arbitration is
therefore serving as a corporate tool, rather than a panacea.189
Nor can individualized arbitration serve as an adequate replacement for
class actions. While some consumers occasionally do and will continue to
bring claims in arbitration, these will likely be the more simple claims—
such as a product that arrived broken or did not arrive at all. Or, if
consumers choose to bring the more difficult claims in individual
arbitration they will likely fail. Individualized arbitration is generally not a
viable venue to allow consumers or others to bring claims as to injuries of
which they are not aware, or injuries they are not aware may result from
186. AT&T Mobility v. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740, 1753 (2011).
187. See Statement of Robert C. Gilbert, supra note 76, at 2 (comparing bank overdraft cases
in which consumers succeeded, in litigated class actions, to those in which they have failed, due to
arbitral class action waivers); Alliance for Justice et al., supra note 3, at 4 (discussing class action
claims which have been “tossed out by courts,” post-Concepcion, and in which claims of absent
class members have therefore “simply disappeared, as opposed to being resolved in arbitration”);
Consumer Attorney’s Report, supra note 3, at 14 (comparing lower settlements afforded to class
members covered by arbitral class action prohibition to higher settlement afforded to class
members not covered by such a prohibition); Finkelstein Thompson LLP’s Comments to Bureau
of Consumer Financial Protection re: Docket No. CFPB-2012-0017 8-11 (June 22, 2012),
available at http://www.regulations.gov/#!docketDetail;dct=FR%252BPR%252BN%252BO%
252BSR;rpp=25;po=0;D=CFPB-2012-0017 (comparing recoveries available in class actions that
were and were not covered by arbitral class action prohibitions); Barnes Law Group, Public
Comment on the Inappropriate Use of Binding Mandatory Arbitration Agreements in Financial
Services Consumer Agreements 3–4 (June 22, 2012), available at http://www.regulations.gov/
#!docketDetail;dct=FR%252BPR%252BN%252BO%252BSR;rpp=25;po=0;D=CFPB-2012-0017
(discussing payday loan cases regarding excessive interest rates brought by firm and observing
that “[t]he lenders whose loan agreements did not contain binding mandatory arbitration
provisions promptly agreed to settle . . . [h]owever, lenders who did insert arbitration provisions
are very different matter”).
188. See Mandatory Binding Arbitration, supra note 12.
189. See Panacea, supra note 1.
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illegal conduct. Nor is individual arbitration a viable venue in which
consumers can present claims that are factually or legally complex, for
example because they require comparisons  of  many  consumers’  experiences  
or presentation of expert testimony. Thus, whether or not consumers do
well in the few arbitrations they bring, the point is that mandatory
arbitration provisions containing class action prohibitions are preventing
consumers from presenting procedurally difficult claims.
Some may not mourn the demise of consumer class actions. Even
those who see some benefit in class actions may decide that the negative
aspects of class actions were always greater than any positive benefits they
might bring.190 It is commonly argued that class actions bring far more
benefit  to  consumers’  attorneys  than  to  consumers.191 As well, some may
also believe that state or federal agencies have or can obtain sufficient
resources to protect consumers whose claims would be procedurally
difficult to present individually.192 Or, those who do not believe consumers
ought to be protected from fraud, contaminated food, antitrust violations,
discrimination, etc. will similarly lose no sleep over the elimination of class
actions.
As Professor Maria Glover aptly explains, the problem is that
“Americans  have  a  love-hate relationship with private enforcement of their
laws.”193 On the one hand, our system often relies heavily and explicitly
upon enforcement by private parties to achieve public regulatory objectives.
Whereas European nations regulate the conduct of their citizens largely
using ex ante regulations promulgated by a centralized bureaucracy, we
frequently rely upon ex post law enforcement, much of which is brought
about by private suits rather than by governmental actions. At the same
time, Americans have a great distrust of private regulation in general and
private litigation in particular.194
For this author, however, the demise of consumer class actions is very
disturbing. I do believe that laws protecting consumers ought to be
enforced. While I am not necessarily wedded to class actions as the means
to bring procedurally difficult claims, I do not see that any realistic
190. As I observed, supra note 35 and accompanying text, I believe Congress, not private
companies, should be privileged to decide whether consumer protection laws should be enforced
and whether class actions should be eviscerated. To the extent the Supreme Court has taken
positions that allow companies to shield themselves from class actions I urge Congress to reject
those decisions.
191. See supra notes 25-27 and accompanying text.
192. This author is quite skeptical that in the remotely foreseeable future our country would
allocate substantial resources to government enforcement agencies.
193. Glover, supra note 103, at 1140.
194. Id.
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alternatives currently exist. Federal and state agencies certainly could, in
theory, be funded at a level where they could bring such claims, but in my
opinion they are not currently so funded.195 And I do not see a move at
present to increase the size of federal and state enforcement agencies. Nor
do I believe that anyone has yet devised a means whereby the Internet,
exciting as it is, can be used to bring procedurally difficult claims of the sort
discussed in this article. While I favor continued brainstorming and
creativity, we should not hold out undue hope that individual consumers
can bring complex claims on their own, even with the assistance of the
Internet or other consumers.
Instead, those of us who believe in consumer protection must, in my
view, fight as hard as we can for the restoration of consumer class actions.
We must make clear that unless our society is willing to either greatly
increase funding for state and federal agencies or relegate consumer
protection laws to the trash, class actions are a necessary means to bring
procedurally difficult claims. While we can accept critique of the class
action device, and seek to revise it to make it more fair and effective, we
cannot accept its total elimination. Thus, it is important to advocate for the
administrative or legislative reversal of Concepcion.
The Consumer Financial Protection Board has been empowered to both
investigate and potentially restrict uses of mandatory arbitration that impact
consumer financial products or services.196 That agency has begun this
effort by issuing a notice asking for suggestions on data that already exists
or should be gathered that might be used in its study.197 This CFPB effort is
very important. The agency has the power to eliminate arbitral class action
195. See also Glover, supra note 103, at 1146–53 (discussing Congressional choice to rely on
private rather than public enforcement); FARHANG, supra note 174 (same). Of course, some
disagree with this author’s opinion that federal and state agencies are not currently adequately
funded to protect consumers from companies’ wrongdoing. See, e.g., Daniel Fisher, supra note 28
(quoting banking attorney Alan Kaplinsky as stating that the CFPB itself has “almost unlimited
resources” to rein in his clients, and that “[m]y clients are a lot more scared about what the CFPB
might be doing than being sued in a class action”).
196. Section 1028 of the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act of
2010 authorizes the agency to report on or potentially regulate or eliminate “the use of agreements
providing for arbitration of any future dispute between covered persons and consumers,” with
respect to “consumer financial products or services.” Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and
Consumer Protection Act, H.R. 4173, 111th Cong. § 1028 (2010). For a good discussion on the
potential role of the Bureau see Laetitia L. Cheltenham, Note, The Consumer Financial Protection
Bureau and Class Action Waivers after AT&T v. Concepcion, 16 N.C. BANKING INST. 273
(2012).
197. Request for Information Regarding Scope, Methods, and Data Sources for Conducting
Study of Pre-Dispute Arbitration Agreements, 77 Fed. Reg. 25148 (Apr. 27, 2012), available at
http://www.regulations.gov/#!documentDetail;D=CFPB-2012-0017-0001. Indeed this Article has
cited a number of the comments submitted in that process.
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prohibitions in one important setting, as well as to issue a study shedding
light on the problem. At the same time the CFPB has not been authorized
to address all consumer issues. And, if the CFPB takes aggressive action to
protect consumer class actions, companies are bound to fight back.198
Congress, of course, has greater power to roll back the Concepcion
decision than does the CFPB. It may, if it chooses, adopt federal legislation
that would prevent companies from using mandatory arbitration clauses to
eliminate class actions.199 Or, Congress could even adopt the Arbitration
Fairness Act,200 which has now been proposed for several years, and which
would prevent companies from requiring consumers or employees to
resolve claims against the company in arbitration rather than in litigation.201
In short, it is time to face reality with respect to the enforcement of
procedurally difficult consumer claims. If we want to protect consumers
from fraud, discrimination, antitrust violations and so on, we need to
provide a means by which these laws can be enforced. Now that the
Supreme Court has helped companies insulate themselves from class
actions we must either reverse the Concepcion decision legislatively, limit it
administratively, or greatly improve the funding of federal and state
enforcement agencies. If we do not take one of these steps to counteract
Concepcion we will through our inaction abandon the enforcement of
procedurally difficult consumer claims. I fervently hope we continue to
ensure that all consumers, even those with procedurally difficult claims,
have access to justice.

198. Companies might, for example, seek to trump such a decision administratively or
legislatively. The CFPB itself has recognized that it is “subject to substantial oversight and
limitations on its activities and authorities.” Building the CFPB, CONSUMER FINANCIAL
PROTECTION BUREAU 32 (July 18, 2011), http://www.consumerfinance.gov/wpcontent/uploads/2011/07/Report_BuildingTheCfpb1.pdf (recognizing that CFPB is constrained
not only by normal constraints of the Administrative Procedures Act and judicial review, but also
that its determinations can be overruled by a council of other federal agencies).
199. Cole, supra note 1, at 498–99 (advocating passage of a Consumer Class Action and Class
Arbitration Waiver Reform Act, in lieu of the Arbitration Fairness Act).
200. S. 987, 112th Cong., 1st Session (2011).
201. S. 987, § 3. See also David Lazarus, Bill Aims to Restore Consumers’ Right to Sue, L.A.
TIMES (Oct. 18, 2011), available at http://articles.latimes.com/2011/oct/18/business/la-fi-lazarus20111018.

